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Abstract
We investigate the link between perceptions and behavior using the wage arrears phenomenon in
Russia as our case study.  To measure perception, we utilize assessments of ‘marketability’ –
what we call perceived demand.  For behavior, we first consider the behavior of managers in the
allocation of wage arrears, and second, the response by workers to wage arrears. Using Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data collected between 1994 and 2004 and controlling for
regional macroeconomic conditions, firm characteristics and worker characteristics in the probit
and Poisson regressions, we find that managers avoid allocating wage arrears to workers with
high perceived demand.  We argue that this happens because workers with high perceived
demand tend to have more employment options and consequently are more likely to quit their
jobs.  Managers try to retain these workers by reducing their wage arrears.  Our empirical results
support this argument, as we find that job change is reduced by lowering arrears.
Key Words: perceived demand, wage arrears, perceptions, behavior, Russia
JEL Classification: A12, J24, J30, J50, P20 Clarke (2003) dates the origin of the “wage arrears” crisis to the second half of 1991, when Yeltsin’s
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government decided to reward the powerful miners’ union for their political support with a large pay increase. 
Unfortunately for the miners, there was no money in the state budget to cover this expenditure, so wage payments
were delayed.  Earle and Sabirianova (2000) also identify the state as the leader in this practice, setting the path-
dependent development of wage arrears in motion.
 A LexisNexis search of “wage arrears in Russia” generated 125 articles in 2005 documenting the
2
magnitude of and  monthly changes in wage arrears, as well as  workers’ hunger strikes in response to wage arrears. 
See, for example, Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS, 11 January 2005, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 March
2005 (from Russian radio) and 19 April (from NTV Mir).
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Perceptions and Behavior: Analyzing Wage Arrears in Russia
Bad things happening to good workers in Russia is old news.  Russia’s wage arrears
phenomenon represents a case in point.    The proportion of workers experiencing wage arrears
1
rose from over 46% in 1994 to nearly 70% in the aftermath of Russia’s financial crisis in 1998, but
even as late as 2004, when macroeconomic conditions had substantially improved, at least 20% of
the civilian workforce reported being owed back wages (RLMS 2005).   What factors influence
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managers’ allocation of wage arrears among their employees?  Does management’s perception of a
worker’s ‘marketability’ – a worker’s ability to find satisfactory alternative employment –
influence their behavior with regard to the allocation of wage arrears?  
Russian workers have responded to wage arrears by changing their saving and expenditure
behavior (Gregory et al 1999, Guariglia and Kim 2003, Skoufias 2003), as well as by changing
their employment conditions: moving to a new workplace (another firm or self-employment),
and/or taking a second job either in the official or informal economy (Earle and Sakova 1999,
Foley 1997, Guariglia and Kim 2004 2006).  Is worker response to wage arrears influenced by
perceptions of their ‘marketability’? 
We investigate the link between perceptions and behavior using the wage arrears
phenomenon in Russia as our case study.  To measure perception, we utilize assessments of
‘marketability’ – what we will call perceived demand.  For behavior, we first consider the behavior
of managers in the allocation of wages arrears, and, second, the response by workers to wage
arrears.  In economies undergoing the transition from central planning to market-oriented
allocation, considering individuals’ perceptions of their potential or alternative employment
opportunities is particularly relevant.  Individual initiative in seeking out and/or training for new See Swafford et al (1997) for complete description of RLMS sample selection methodology and sample
3
characteristics.
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jobs, as well as one’s ability to adjust to new economic conditions, play a major role in
determining one’s success in transitional labor markets.  Perceived demand can serve as a measure
of initiative or adjustment – so-called ‘soft skills’ not captured by standard measures of human
capital – and therefore more accurately explain observed labor market outcomes.  Additionally, in
Russia, where local labor markets often are monopsonistic, perceived demand may indicate worker
bargaining power in negotiating the terms of employment and working conditions.
We use Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) data  collected between 1994
3
and 2004 to test two basic hypotheses about the relationship between perceptions and behavior:
1 H:  Managers refrain from allocating wage arrears to workers with high perceived demand
(high marketability).
2 H:  Workers with high perceived demand (high marketability) are more likely to change
jobs in an attempt to avoid wage arrears.
Why does it matter if perceived demand influences the behavior of Russian managers and
workers?  Generally, despite the voluminous literature analyzing the link between the two, the
knowledge gap associated with actually measuring the influence of perceptions on behavior
remains rather large.  In part, this stems from the multiplicity of perceptions and behaviors under
investigation (see, for example, Ettner and Grzywacz 2001, Goehring and Stager 1991, Jaskyte
2003, Lanour and Bowler 1998, Whaley 2003), and, in part, from the paucity of appropriate data. 
Our study adds to the empirical analyses of perceptions and behavior, and is the first to utilize
survey data collected from a representative sample of the Russian population.  
More specifically, there are at least three reasons why understanding the link between
perceptions and behavior among managers and workers in Russia who confront wage arrears is
helpful.  First, accurately identifying characteristics of workers prone to wage arrears facilitates
better design of policies to avoid or offset the wage arrears trap, and, consequently, improves
welfare.  By wage arrears trap, we mean the observed outcome that individuals who experience
wage arrears in one period are more likely to experience wage arrears in subsequent periods. 
Second, understanding the link between perceptions and behavior enables managers in Russia, in
both domestic and foreign-owned firms, to more effectively motivate and/or retain workers,
thereby improving productivity and profitability.  Third, understanding the link between3
perceptions and behavior in Russia’s wage arrears situation gives researchers an opportunity to
assess the extent to which general findings regarding the link between the two apply to this rather
unique phenomenon.
Our paper is divided into seven parts.  Part I briefly summarizes the wage arrears
phenomenon in Russia during its transformation from a planned economy to a market-oriented
economy.  Part II describes the survey data and sample of respondents used in our analysis.  We
explain how we construct our wage arrears measures in Part III and provide a descriptive analysis
of the wage arrears phenomenon using these RLMS data.  Part IV develops our measures of
perceived demand and motivates the hypotheses to be tested in this analysis.  Part V provides the
model that depicts managerial strategies in allocating wage arrears among workers.  Controlling for
regional macroeconomic conditions, firm characteristics, and worker characteristics, we use probit
and Poisson regressions to estimate the influence of perceived demand on manager’s allocation of
wage non-payment and wage debt.  Our results suggest that managers attempt to avoid allocating
wage arrears to workers with high perceived demand.  Indeed, perceived demand plays a greater
role in the arrears allocation process than the individual’s educational attainment.  This result is
particularly strong when wage debt is used as our measure of wage arrears.  In Part VI we consider
the influence of perceived demand on worker response to wage arrears through job change, using
probit regressions, and controlling for the same macroeconomic conditions, firm characteristics,
and worker characteristics.  We find that job change is significantly  higher among workers with
high perceived demand.  Concluding remarks are offered in Part VII. 
I.  Wage Arrears in Russia’s Transition Economy
Following Russia’s price liberalization in January 1992, pressure on wages throughout the
economy dramatically increased.  Moreover, policies adopted (and not adopted) during Russia’s
transition process, and the under-developed nature of requisite legal and financial institutions for
the successful introduction of a market economy, combined to put Russian firms in a situation
where they faced chronic cash shortages (Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 2000, Cohen et al 1995, Ickes
and Ryterman 1992 1993, Krueger 2004).  Not surprisingly, the number of unprofitable enterprises
(both state-owned and privately-owned) grew steadily, accounting for 27 percent of total
enterprises in 1995, 43 percent in 1996, 47 percent in1997, and 56 percent in 1998 (FIPC 1997,
IEWS 1998).  Throughout this period, inter-enterprise debt in the form of overdue payables
hovered in the range of 50% of GDP (Commander and Mumssen 1998).  By 1998, one-third of all The seminal product of this research was a paper by Alfandari and Schaffer (1996), which utilized data
4
drawn from official Goskomstat reports published between October 1993 and January 1995 and a survey of large-
scale and medium-scale industrial enterprises to evaluate the relationships between (1) overdue commercial payables
to suppliers and receivables from customers, (2) overdue bank liabilities, (3) overdue tax and social security payables
to the government, and (4) overdue wages to employees.  Each of these variables was measured in terms of the
aggregate debt across firms. Goskomstat was the most comprehensive source of information available on wage
arrears at the time.  But Goskomstat data ultimately proved to be inadequate for measuring this phenomenon in five
important respects. For complete discussion see Petrin and Linz (2005).  
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Russian enterprises were technically insolvent – that is, their total assets were less than twice the
value of their liabilities (World Bank 1998).
The collapse of product markets in the (near) hyper-inflationary environment during the
early stages of Russia’s transition process pushed privatized firms to cut costs wherever they could. 
Despite the Soviet legacy of overfull employment (Granick 1987, Clarke 1999), mass reduction in
workforce size to bring employment in line with production requirements was not really an option
for privatized firms.  By law, workers were entitled to severance pay equal to three months
earnings (Clarke 2000a 2000b, Roxenborough and Shapiro 1996, Rymkevitch 2003), and the
majority of privatized firms simply could not afford these payments.  
Following the state’s lead, firms engaged in the practice of wage non-payment, despite new
laws that prioritized the payment of tax and wage debts over all others.  Privatized firms, especially
large industrial enterprises operating in monopsonistic labor markets, were “exempted” from these
laws by local governments trying to shield workers by offering lucrative tax breaks and “recovery”
grants to firms that promised to keep employees on the books (Alfandari and Schaffer 1996,
Broadman and Recantini 2001, Commander and Tolstopiatenko 2001, Grogan 1999, Nesporova
1999). Officially, unemployment remained low, but hidden forms of unemployment, including
compulsory unpaid leave and non-payment of wages, became commonplace (Bragin and
Osakovsky 2005, Commander and Yemtsov 1999, Standing 1996).
II.  Data description and sample characteristics
Research on wage arrears in Russia was initiated by the World Bank as part of a general
study of the transition process, and, more particularly, of the causes and consequences of inter-
enterprise arrears.   To supplement Goskomstat data, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
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(RLMS), initially funded by the World Bank, first included questions to address the wage arrears
phenomenon in1994, and has since become, by far, the most commonly used source in analyses
that directly or indirectly focus on wage arrears in Russia.  The survey has important advantages
over other existing sources of Russian data, as it is both nationally representative and containsGiven mobility and other constraints not typical of the rest of the working population, individuals who
5
reported themselves ask working for the military in any capacity were excluded.  Moreover, while other researchers
have elected to drop individuals in the RLMS who are not officially “working age” (18-60 years old for men and 18-
55 years old for women), we have elected to keep younger workers who meet the employment criteria, and have only
dropped those older workers who are over age 65 years. 
 Ambiguity regarding labor force participation emerges from the fact that respondents give different
6
responses to similar questions, making no one question a sure-fire signal of employment status. 
 Excluded are the categories of students, housewives, and retired (and no longer working).
7
 Excluded are individual farmers, senior government officials, artists and entertainers, fashion models,
8
religious leaders, and so on, who have rather atypical performance criteria to meet in highly specialized labor
markets.
 All except notpaid are the original RLMS variable names, minus the survey-round prefix. Notpaid is
9
derived from the inverse of the RLMS variable jobpay. 
5
individual-level information.
Data for our analysis of the relationship between perceptions and behavior were obtained
from all rounds of the RLMS Phase II (rounds V-XIII), which correspond to years 1994, 1995,
1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.  To identify the group of respondents suitable for
the analysis, we required that respondents demonstrate strong attachment to the civilian labor
force.    Strong attachment to the civilian labor force was demonstrated if respondents satisfied two
5
criteria:  (1) in response to the question about their “main occupation,” they selected “employed,”
6
“on official childcare or maternity leave,” or “unemployed, actively looking for work;”  and (2)
7
they reported holding a primary job coded according to the four-digit International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) that is consistent with an employee working in a civilian
(non-farm) enterprise.   The size of the resulting sample is 40,794 observations, although we are
8
obliged in some instances to use smaller, sub-samples, given the (lack of) available data for some
years.  We provide summary statistics in the Appendix to clarify which sub-samples are used in
particular regression analyses. 
Wage Arrears Measures
The RLMS data set contains four variables that address wage arrears, each providing a
somewhat different way of measuring the phenomenon:  amtow, owed, nopaym, and notpaid. 
9
Amtow reflects answers to the question: “How much money in all have they [your place of
work] not paid you?” and is given in ruble-denominated values.  Amtow is not usually used in
empirical analyses of wage arrears because it only specifies the nominal value of total wage debt, Notpaid equals 1 when respondents answer negatively.  We note that even a positive response to the
10
question could be associated with partial payment, and thus does not cleanly capture the wage arrears phenomenon.
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not when the wage debt was incurred (Desai and Idson 2000).  Analysis of nominal debt is not
meaningful in periods of high inflation, which Russia experienced for much of the transition. 
Moreover, without specific information about the actual timing of past wage arrears, it is
impossible to calculate the real value of wage debt from amtow.   
Owed is a binary variable specifying a yes-no answer to the question, “At the present time,
does your place of work owe you any money, which for various reasons was not paid on time?” 
Table 1 reports the percentage of the civilian workforce who responded affirmatively to this
question.   
Nopaym reflects answers to the question: “For how many months has the enterprise not
paid this money to you?”  Nopaym is reported as an ordinal measure of quantity, which has been
interpreted as signifying the number of monthly “paychecks” owed (Earle and Sabirinova 1999). 
Table 1 reports the mean value for nopaym (months owed) for all RLMS survey rounds between
1994 and 2004.  Typically, analyses of wage arrears have either used owed to define instances, or
“incidents,” in which a wage debt is accrued (see, for example, Desai and Idson 2000, Earle and
Sabirianova 2000 2002, Earle et al 2003; Gerry et al 2004; Lehmann et al 1999), or nopaym – to
capture the relative or absolute level wage debt accumulated by individuals at a given point in time
(Earle et al 2004, Earle and Sabirianova Peter 2004).
The fourth RLMS wage arrears variable is notpaid.  Notpaid is a binary indicator variable
based on answers to the question:  “At your primary job in the last 30 days, did you receive some
amount of money in the form of wages, bonuses, grants, benefits, revenues, or profits?”  Notpaid
directly addresses the occurrence of wage non-payment.   Since wage non-payment is the direct
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causal link to wage debt, it is curious that no study to date has utilized this variable.  Certainly,
notpaid is not a perfect measure of current non-payment because it does not distinguish between
partial and full wage payments.  However, it does identify the cases where current arrears are most
prominent and where they are likely to matter most.  For example, it is reasonable to expect that
worker response to current non-payment will be stronger if wages are not paid at all, while partial
wage payment may signal an employer’s willingness and ability to resolve financial difficulties
and, hence, may have little effect on worker behavior.  Therefore, in our analysis, we use owed and
nopaym as measures of wage debt, and notpaid as a measure of current non-payment.  7
Workers have to experience wage non-payment in order to report wage debt, but it is not
the case that owed and notpaid are identical or inter-changeable.  We hypothesize that managers
and workers will behave differently when faced with these two different conditions.  We speculate,
for example, that managers may be rather liberal in allocating wage non-payment (notpaid),
perhaps believing that for morale purposes it is best to refrain from paying all workers in a given
month.  We further speculate that managers may prioritize workers in the reduction of wage debt
(owed, nopaym) in order to ensure that those most valuable to the company are retained. 
Moreover, we consider the possibility that workers view wage non-payment and wage debt
differently, and, consequently, respond differently to the two conditions.  We also consider the
possibility that workers respond differently depending on the magnitude of the wage debt
(nopaym): the greater the magnitude of wage debt, the less likely are workers to change workplaces
because, in effect, they lose claim to back pay.  To test these hypotheses, we conduct our analysis
for each of the wage arrears measures: notpaid, owed, and nopaym.  
III. Variation in Wage Arrears
By 1994, when the RLMS first began surveying Russian workers to determine the scope of
wage arrears, nearly one-quarter reported not receiving full wage payment in the previous pay
period (notpaid) and more than 40% of the respondents were already reporting that they were owed
money (owed) by their employer (see Table 1).  Reporting of wage arrears peaked between 1996
and 1998 (no RLMS conducted in 1997), and then declined markedly.  Considering the fact that
the magnitude of wage arrears was halved at the end of 2004 –  from 24 billion rubles on 1 January
2004 to12 billion rubles ($432 million) on 1 January 2005 (RIA Novosti, 29 March 2005), with
much of the reduction coming in November and December 2004 – it appears that even government
officials have recognized that Russian workers’ tolerance for wage arrears is diminishing. 
However, the fact that wage arrears rose by nearly 20%, to 14.3 billion rubles by 1 February 2005,
affecting as many as 2.4 million employees (Prime-Tass, 22 February 2005), suggests that a
permanent fix for the wage arrears situation is not on the immediate horizon.  Petrin et al (2006)
offers a detailed explanation for why wage arrears rose dramatically in Russia during deteriorating
macroeconomic conditions and continue to persist despite improving macroeconomic conditions.
According to RLMS data, despite the general pattern of increasing wage arrears through
1998, and then declining wage arrears after the financial crisis, the incidence of wage arrears varied
substantially by location and sector between 1994 and 2004.  As seen in Table 2, the percentage of Bad financial conditions are defined as firms which utilize unpaid leaves and payment in-kind to manage
11
cash-flow problems. 
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workers living in Moscow and St. Petersburg who report being owed wages is substantially below
the country average; regions far-removed from the “center” exhibit a significantly higher incidence
of wage arrears (Siberia, North Caucasus, for example).  Desai and Idson (2000) find an inverse
relationship across regions between the level of economic development and the incidence of wage
arrears.  Workers in economically depressed regions – measured in terms of per capita GDP,
unemployment rate, median wage, and other indicators – have been hardest hit by (have the highest
incidence of) non-payment of wages and the subsequent persistence of wage debt.  Moreover, in
comparison to individuals living in urban settlements, the percentage of workers owed wages is
much higher in rural settlements: 61% reported being owed back wages in 1994, 76% in 1998,
41% in 2002, and just under 30% in 2004 (see Table 2).  That is, between 1994 and 2004, on
average, nearly 50% of the civilian workforce living in rural settlements reported wage arrears,
compared to 30% of the workforce living in urban settlements.  
While detailed firm-level data are not provided in the RLMS, differences in the incidence
of wage arrears between 1994 and 2004 appear to be linked to firm characteristics.  Workers
employed by privately-owned firms, whether foreign or domestic, are significantly less likely to
report wage arrears (Table 2), as are workers employed by small firms (firms which employ 100 or
fewer workers), although this advantage seems to diminish over time.  Workers in firms with bad
financial conditions  are consistently more likely to report wage arrears.  
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We measure wage debt, in part, using the number of monthly paychecks owed (nopaym). 
Between 1994 and 2004, the number of monthly paychecks owed averaged 3.5 (RLMS 2005). 
Workers in Western Siberia were owed an average of 5.2 paychecks during this period (Table 2,
paychecks), while those in the Urals, Central and Central Black Earth regions, as well as those in
Moscow and St. Petersburg averaged less than three.  Once again, rural-urban differences are
pronounced: workers in rural settlements report an average of about 5 months’ earnings owed,
workers in urban settlements average about 3 months earnings owed. 
The incidence of wage arrears between 1994 and 2004 appears to vary by worker
characteristics (see Table 3), but not dramatically.  Younger workers (15-24 years old), workers
with some university education, and workers who recently hired in to the company (job tenure is
less than 1 year) tend to be somewhat less likely to report wage arrears.  These characteristics may9
be capturing a “mobility effect,” however, especially if contrasted against workers with more than
10 years at the company and workers with less than 9 years of schooling.  The incidence of wage
arrears tends to be lower among workers in occupations closest to cash transactions (“clerical,
sales, services”) and among workers in occupations where wages are above the national average
(“managers and  professionals,” and “skilled technical and administrative”).  
RLMS data indicate the persistence of wage arrears despite improving macroeconomic
conditions, although wage arrears do tend to vary by region, industry, firm and worker in ways
consistent with firm survival strategies adopted in an environment of financial turmoil and liquidity
constraints.  Despite the overall reduction in wage arrears associated with improved
macroeconomic conditions, our current understanding of the wage arrears phenomenon in Russia is
insufficient to rule out the possibility of a return to widespread wage arrears if macroeconomic
conditions worsen.  Furthermore, our current understanding of Russia’s wage arrears phenomenon
fails to adequately account for how managers allocate wage arrears.  Earle and Sabirianova (2000
2004) use RLMS data to show that once a worker experiences wage arrears, that worker faces a
higher likelihood of remaining in the wage arrears trap (will continue to experience wage arrears). 
Moreover, their analysis indicates that, despite local labor market conditions, wage arrears can be
avoided by some workers – between 40% and 70% of the RLMS respondents surveyed between
1994 and 2000 reported no paychecks owed (Earle and Sabirianova 2004, Table 1).  We
hypothesize that managers avoid allocating wage arrears to workers with high perceived demand. 
Why?  We hypothesize that managers recognize that Russian workers with high perceived demand
are more likely to leave the workplace/change jobs to avoid wage arrears.
IV.  Perceived Demand and Wage Arrears
Why should perceived demand matter in the allocation of and response to wage arrears? 
We define perceived demand as a worker’s assessment of his/her ‘marketability’ – that is, one’s
perception of one’s ability to find comparable alternative employment.  We assume this assessment
is shared by both workers and their managers.  We argue that there are two possible reasons why
perceived demand should matter in the wage arrears phenomenon.  The first reason relates to
managers’ decisions to reward good workers by minimizing their wage arrears.  Since
‘marketability’ is positively related to productivity, a worker’s perceived demand should reflect the
value of this worker to the firm.  In this case, managers might choose to discriminate between
different types of workers, not only to reward good workers, but also to retain the most valuable10
ones.  
The second reason relates to workers’ response to wage arrears.  Earle and Sabirianova
(2000) develop model of managerial choice in the allocation of wage arrears which compares the
benefits to the firm from arrears to the costs imposed on the firm by worker and government
response to the practice.  In their model, worker quits, among other factors, impose additional costs
on employers, and since workers are more likely to remain at their workplace if wages are paid in
full and on time, employers’ optimal strategy may be to reduce arrears in order to prevent quit
behavior and thus cut these costs. 
We are interested in the factors that influence the behavior of managers and workers. 
Based on results reported in numerous studies, we expect to find that arrears are associated with a
higher probability of job change by workers.  Furthermore, we hypothesize that, regardless of local
labor market conditions, worker response to wage arrears, and thus the allocation of wage arrears
by managers, will be influenced by perceived demand.  We hypothesize that workers with higher
perceived demand are likely to change jobs more often, and therefore, managers may choose to
avoid allocating wage arrears to such workers in order to avoid the costs associated with losing
valuable employees.
While there are no existing theoretical or empirical studies that identify factors which
contribute to perceived demand, we hypothesize that perceived demand is inversely related to job
insecurity (fear of job loss) and positively related to skills (perceived, actual).  Consequently, we
utilize two different measures of perceived demand when we examine the influence of perceived
demand on the allocation of wage arrears by managers and the response to wage arrears by
workers.  Using multiple measures allows us to test the robustness of our results. 
Measuring Perceived Demand
We first consider the proposition that perceptions of ‘marketability’ may be discerned from
one’s sense job security and the ability to provide for one’s basic needs (Elman and O’Rand 2002). 
That is, we view perceived demand as inversely related to job insecurity and/or the inability to
provide basic necessities: the greater the fear of job loss and the higher the concern about one’s
inability to provide for one’s basic needs, the lower one’s perceived demand.  Three RLMS
questions included in each round of the survey address these issues.  Respondents were asked: 
Imagine this not very pleasant scene: the enterprise or organization where you work, for
some reason will close tomorrow, and all workers will be laid off.  How certain are you
that you will be able to find work, no worse than your present job? (FINDJB) To maintain consistency in the three variables, we reversed the coding of the responses for FINDJB so
12
that 1 = absolutely uncertain and 5 = absolutely certain.
 We note that in the original wording, the options given are: 1= that is exactly like you ... 4 =it is not at all
13
like you.
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How concerned are you that you might lose your job?  (CHANJL)
How concerned are you about the possibility that you might not be able to provide yourself
with the bare essentials in the next 12 months?  (AGETNE)
In each case, respondents are given a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 reflects a negative assessment
(fear) and 5 reflects a positive assessment (confidence).   Because the reliability coefficient
12
(Cronbach alpha) equals 0.61, we construct a composite measure of perceived demand,
PCVDMD1, using these three questions.  PCVDMD1 has a minimum value of 3 and maximum
value of 15.  We arbitrarily categorize scores of 6 and lower as “low” perceived demand and scores
of 12 and higher as “high” perceived demand. 
We also consider the proposition that perceptions of ‘marketability’ may be discerned from
assessments of one’s skills (Handel 2003, Hargittai and Shafer 2006, Jenkins 2001, Pallier 2003). 
That is, we view  perceived demand as positively related to perceived (and actual) skills.  Our
second measure of perceived demand, PCVDMD2, is based on the following question, which was
asked only beginning in 1996:  
Consider this statement – is it like you or not: “It seems to me that I have few of those
qualities that are valued in the economic situation of today” ...? (VALUED)
Respondents were given a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 reflects few valued skills and 4 reflects many
valued skills.    “Low” perceived demand is defined as a score equal to 1; “high” perceived
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demand is defined as a score equal to 4.  This variable is not available prior to 1996, nor is it
available in 2001, so our analysis using PCVDMD2 is necessarily performed on a smaller sub-
sample of the data.
Do workers with high perceived demand differ from those with low perceived demand? 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for both perceived demand measures by select worker
characteristics and wage arrears status.  That is, Table 4a reports the percentage of respondents
categorized as having “low” and “high” perceived demand using the composite measure
(PCVDMD1), as well as the mean response by select worker characteristics and wage arrears
status.  Table 4b reports similar results for the skills measure (PCVDMD2).  Several patterns are
evident.  First, regardless of measure, the percentage of workers in the “low” perceived demand12
category rises each year prior to Russia’s financial crisis in August 1998.  This reflects not only
growing perceptions of job insecurity but also concerns about having sufficient skills.  Given the
magnitude of the structural economic transformation taking place, this result is hardly surprising. 
Second, in comparison to men, a greater percentage of women consistently fall into the “low”
perceived demand category.  The gender difference in response patterns is substantial and
statistically significant – not only are women more concerned than men that they might lose their
job and not be able to find anything comparable, women also consistently report that their skills are
not as valued in the current economic situation.   Third, generational differences in response
patterns also are significant: older workers (over age 40 at the time the survey was conducted)
emerge more frequently in the “low” perceived demand category and less frequently in the “high”
perceived demand category.   For younger workers (less than age 25 at time of survey), the
opposite holds true: more frequently in the “high” perceived demand category and less frequently
in the “low” perceived demand category.   Fourth, a greater percentage of individuals with at least
some university education tend to emerge in the “high” perceived demand category, but this result
diminishes over time.  
Perceived demand also varies by job tenure: individuals employed at the same workplace
for over 10 years consistently account for the greatest proportion of workers with “low” perceived
demand.  For occupation, the pattern is not so clear.  These data suggest that, over time,
employment conditions possibly improved for “skilled manual” and “clerical, sales, service”
workers, as the percentage of these workers in the “high” perceived demand category appears to
increase, albeit not uniformly.  While “managers and professionals” routinely are found among
those reporting “high” perceived demand, no other systematic difference emerges by occupation. 
In contrast, there is a clear relationship between wage arrears and perceived demand: individuals
who report wage arrears fall into the “low” perceived demand category more often than those for
whom wages are paid in a timely manner.  The difference is substantial and statistically significant.
Table 5 reports the “low” and “high” perceived demand categories by region and firm
characteristics: Table 5a focuses on the composite measure associated with fear of job loss
(PCVDMD1); Table 5b focuses on the valued skills measure (PCVDMD2).  The “best” perceived
demand outcomes are associated with individuals who live in Moscow/St Petersburg and/or work
in foreign-owned firms.  Living in urban settlements is better than rural settlements, as is working
in a non-state-owned firm.  The firm’s financial health has little discernable influence on perceived The surveys typically are conducted in October/November.  Consequently, in 1998, workers had
14
experienced the adverse consequences of the crash for at least three months before they participated in the survey.
For a detailed discussion of causes and consequences of financial crisis, see Kharas et al (2001).
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demand response patterns, and it is only after the financial crisis in 1998 that local unemployment
conditions have an important influence on perceived demand – individuals living in locales where
unemployment is relatively low exhibit higher perceived demand.
Perhaps most strikingly evident in Table 4 and Table 5 is the impact of Russia’s financial
crisis in August 1998 on perceived demand; mean scores are significantly lower in 1998 in
comparison to 1996.   The impact of the financial crisis on perceived demand was substantial,
14
albeit not uniform –  the impact varies by worker characteristics, as well as by region and by firm
characteristics.  Similarly, the recovery of perceived demand after the crisis occurs at a much
different pace, depending upon worker characteristics, and regional and firm conditions.  A
detailed analysis of factors influencing perceived demand among the respondents participating in
RLMS between 1994 and 2004 is provided in Linz et al (2006).
Perceived Demand and the Allocation of Wage Arrears by Managers
We consider two hypotheses regarding the way in which perceived demand may influence
the allocation of wage arrears by managers.
1 H:   Managers do not consider perceived demand in the allocation of wage-nonpayment
(notpaid).
2 H:   Managers do consider perceived demand in the allocation of wage debt (owed,
nopaym), and will refrain from allocating wage debt to workers with high perceived demand (high
marketability).
Our first hypothesis reflects the premise that a firm’s financial conditions drive wage
arrears.  Bad financial conditions (lack of funds) oblige managers in loss-making firms to delay
wage payments.  We posit that managers are likely to delay wage payments for all workers to
minimize the adverse effect on morale associated with differential treatment.  Anecdotal evidence
suggests, for example, that while Russian managers may prefer to be selective in deciding who to
pay, giving preference to more highly-valued workers, this might not be practical or efficient from
the standpoint of maintaining worker morale.  Few practices can be more destructive of workplace An extensive management and psychology literature suggests that the most cost-effective way for
15
managers to handle cash-flow problems, whether real or contrived, is to undertake a practice of uniform treatment –
in this case, distribute wage arrears across-the-board, to all workers.  For a review of the literatures, see Linz et al
(2006), Tekleab et al (2005).
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morale than the imposition of selective cuts in wages and benefits.   
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Wage non-payment might also occur in profit-making firms if alternative financial
opportunities are present and the cost to the firm of delaying wage payment is small.  Attractive
financial opportunities were present in Russia beginning in 1995 when short-term state bonds,
GKOs, were issued (Kharas et al 2001, Millar 2003).  Capital flight estimates rising from 3% of
GDP in 1995 to over 18% of GDP in 2000 (Abalkin and Whalley 1999, Grigoryev and Kosarev
2000, Lougani and Mauro 2000, Tikhomirov 1997) suggest that firms also were able to take
advantage of attractive financial opportunities outside of Russia.  Earle and Sabirianova (2004)
consider the costs imposed on the firm by wage non-payment: reduced work effort and thus lower
productivity/profitability, labor turnover and thus higher training costs and/or lower
productivity/profitability, and penalties imposed by government authorities for violating labor
codes.  They conclude that the latter cost, penalties imposed by government authorities, is rarely
enforced, and that the former cost, lower productivity, is attenuated by locale labor market
conditions that reduce employee options to respond to wage arrears.  Consequently, we do not rule
out the possibility of wage non-payment in firms in good financial condition.  We simply suggest
that if managers decide to pursue a wage non-payment strategy in a particular month, the wage
non-payment is likely assigned to all workers.  
Our second hypothesis is based on the premise that managers’ wage debt strategies
ultimately are governed by firm-performance objectives, and not defined exclusively by current
financial conditions.  We follow our first hypothesis that managers adopt an across-the-board wage
non-payment strategy with the proposition that managers rotate the repayment of wage debt on a
priority basis, where priority is defined by a worker’s contribution to the firm and/or the likelihood
of losing a valued worker.  This two-part strategy targets firm performance to the extent that
managers may conclude that they can reduce antagonisms in the workplace in the short term and
thus maintain or improve worker performance in the longer term.  We predict that wage debt will
be higher among workers who have fewer alternative employment options.  Our objective is to
explicitly test the hypothesis that both the incidence (owed) and magnitude (nopaym) of wage debt
will be higher among workers with low perceived demand. One difficulty associated with conducting our analysis using RLMS data is the fact that if workers change
16
locations they are dropped from the survey (for further discussion, see Andrienko and Guriev, 2004).   Workers may
not be able to improve their wage arrears situation by changing employers in the local labor market because of
adverse economic conditions.  If workers move to jobs in new locations, where economic conditions are better, they
are no longer included in the survey.  Consequently, we are not able to directly test the hypothesis that job change
influences wage arrears. 
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Perceived Demand and the Response by Workers to Wage Arrears
We focus our analysis of worker response to wage arrears on the decision to change
workplaces.  The RLMS included a job change question for the first time in 1996, but the wording
of the question made it impossible to determine whether the respondent changed jobs within a
workplace or changed workplaces.   In subsequent surveys, the response options became more
16
specific in order to capture this difference.  Our focus is on whether an individual changed
employers, so we re-code and construct newjob to reflect this behavior. 
We consider two hypotheses regarding the way in which perceived demand may influence
worker response to wage arrears:
1 H:  Workers with high perceived demand will be more likely to change jobs (workplaces).
2 H:  Other things equal, workers who experience wage arrears will be more likely to change
workplaces, but the probability of job change declines as the size of the wage debt grows. 
 We posit that if job change occurs among workers with high perceived demand and if
wage arrears are positively correlated with job change, this can be viewed as a signal of job change
being a worker’s attempt to improve his/her employment conditions in response to wage arrears.
V.  Allocation of Wage Arrears 
To better understand the wage arrears phenomenon, we utilize three measures in our
analysis of managers’ allocation of wage arrears: notpaid, owed, and nopaym.  In this way we hope
to be able to assess whether Russian managers differentiate their behavior in terms of generating
new wage debts and managing old ones, and how this is affected by perceived demand.
To assess the likelihood that a worker will be allocated wage arrears by his/her manager, we
use the following probit model:
where
with notpaid and owed as our two measures of the incidence of wage arrears. Ö is the standard
normal cumulative density function. The RLMS data records ownership variables in non-exclusive categories that can be confusing.  We re-
17
code these variables as follows: a state-owned firm is one that is exclusively state-owned; a Russian-owned or
foreign-owned firm is one that is either wholly owned by private interests or is constituted as a joint venture with the
state.  There is not overlap in the sample between Russian and foreign ownership understood in this way.  Russian
private-owned includes both privatized and newly-created private (de novo) firms. 
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To assess the intensity, or duration, of wage arrears, we use a Poisson model with:
In all three specifications, our objective is to assess the relative impact of perceived demand
on the allocation of wage arrears.  We control for the observed attributes of firms, individuals, and
macroeconomic conditions.  Summary statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis
are provided in the Appendix.   Here we briefly describe the economy, firm and individual
variables.  To capture macroeconomic conditions, economy, we use region dummies, oblast-level
unemployment rates (calculated by IMF and matched with RLMS sampling units), a dummy
variable for settlement type (rural versus urban) and finally, we include time dummies.  In this way,
we are able to identify, at least in part, the effect of changes over time in the structure and
macroeconomic conditions on the wage arrears phenomenon in Russia.
We include two firm-level variables that are likely to have an important effect on wage
arrears: ownership and financial health.  We construct dummy variables to identify three ownership
categories:  foreign-owned (including joint ventures with state), state-owned, and Russian private-
owned enterprises.   Private (de novo) firms, and foreign-owned firms, appear to be more inclined
17
to voluntarily adhere to legally prescribed fair labor practices, perhaps because they have better
opportunities than privatized and state-owned firms to adjust costs.  Privatized firms, although
shaped by the Soviet legacy, are seen to be more responsive to restructuring needs than state-
owned firms. Consequently, we expect wage arrears to be highest among state-owned firms and
lowest among private (de novo, privatized or foreign-owned) firms.
Clarke (2000) has shown, however, that assumptions regarding the expected differences in
performance between private, privatized, and state-owned firms can be misleading.  If the firm’s
financial health is in jeopardy, ownership structure might not matter at all.  Thus, we follow Clarke
(2000) in positing that the relative financial health of the firm is an independent variable in its own
right.  To identify “financial health” of the firm, we construct two dichotomous indicator variables:
firms in bad financial health are (1) more apt to pay workers in-kind (goods) rather than in cash,
and (2) more likely to enforce compulsory leaves of absence as a way to formally retain the The RLMS variable for “maximum grade completed” is misleading. While 50 percent of all respondents
18
in the RLMS sample report that they have completed no more than the compulsory ninth-grade education, two-thirds
of these have gone on at some point in their lives to acquire advanced training at the secondary school, community
college, or university level.  Altogether, nearly 90 percent of the RLMS sample reports some level of advanced
training, either vocational or academic/professional, degree or non-degree.  Confusion can arise from the use of the
remaining indicator variables that the RLMS uses for the various formal levels of secondary and post-secondary
education.  Because these variables are non-exclusive, respondents may be doubly or triply counted in any study that
does not carefully discriminate.  Consequently, the method we have chosen here to classify education is as follows:
(1) respondents are divided into two groups based on whether or not they indicate that they have received any
education beyond the secondary school level.  Those who answer “no” are classified as “secondary education or
less.”  (2) The remainder are classified as either “some post-secondary education” or “university level graduate”
depending on the highest level of achievement reported.  While this method sacrifices some detail, it has the
advantage of providing us with three meaningful categories of education that should enable us to measure their
relative effects on wage arrears outcomes.
 RLMS researchers at the University of North Carolina caution against mechanically collapsing the
19
occupation coding scheme: “This does not, in our estimation, constitute a valid ordinal scale. For example, many
professionals also perform secondary managerial functions and may have more authority over other employees than
some people who are classified as managers.  Crafts workers may well be more skilled, educated, and highly paid
than some clerks.” [ http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/data/occupationalcoding.html ].
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services of their employees while simultaneously adjusting their wage bills.  We hypothesize that
wage arrears will be more likely among individuals who work for firms in bad financial health,
regardless of the firm’s ownership structure. 
The advantage of using RLMS data to evaluate wage arrears outcomes is that it enables us
to control for the attributes and attitudes that workers bring to the decision-making process in a
more systematic way.   We include the following individual characteristics: age, gender, marital
status (dummy variable equals one if married), education (secondary or less, vocational-level
training, university-level training),  job tenure (years at current workplace), and occupation. 
18
RLMS data enable us to assess whether occupations are neutral with regard to wage arrears,
as previous studies have suggested.  We start from the occupational classification provided in
RLMS (400 job codes are included in the sample), and then, rather than collapse the four-digit
codes into two-digit or one-digit codes (which typically yield discrete categories that make no
sense),  we construct a classification that focuses on sorting jobs by those characteristics that we
19
believe are most relevant to the study of wage arrears: management and non-management
positions, manual and non-manual positions, and skilled and unskilled positions.  Dummy
variables were constructed to represent each of the seven resulting categories:  managers and
professionals; skilled technical and administrative personnel; clerical, sales and service personnel;
teachers, nurses, and social workers; skilled manual workers; semi-skilled manual workers; and Studies show that firms close to cash transactions tend to be financially better off and tend to rely less on
20
barter transactions to conduct their business operations (Krueger 2004, Krueger and Linz 2002).
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unskilled manual workers. 
Additionally, we include a lagged dependent variable (the value of the dependent variable
in the previous survey round), which measures the persistence of wage arrears over time and helps
to capture the effect of the unobserved individual and firm-specific characteristics.  Because we are
using lags, we lose the first period (1994), and we have to limit the sample to the respondents who
appear in at least two consecutive rounds of the survey.
We estimate the model for each of the three wage arrears measures, using both perceived
demand measures.  In our regression analysis, the perceived demand measures are the initial
continuous variables that were standardized to have zero sample mean and unit variance.  We
allowed the perceived demand effects to vary in time by interacting the perceived demand
measures with time dummies.  When tests suggested that there was no significant variation over
time, we imposed coefficients equality.  The effects of all other factors were assumed to be time-
constant. 
Wage Arrears Regression Results
The estimated partial effects of the economy, firm, and individual characteristics on wage
arrears are reported in Table 6.  The main patterns resemble those revealed by the descriptive
statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3.  As seen in Table 6, wage arrears were most severe in 1996-
1998, and declined steadily in the subsequent years, as macroeconomic conditions improved. 
Regional differences are substantial, with the worst situation observed in the remote Siberian
regions.  Arrears are less of a problem in urban settlements, generally, and in the metropolitan
areas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, particularly, because employment opportunities are more
plentiful, especially in comparison to rural areas. 
Occupations suffering least from arrears are the relatively mobile clerical/sales/service
occupations, which also have an advantage of being close to cash transactions.   Our estimates
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show that skilled workers tend to fare relatively well in comparison to their unskilled counterparts. 
The only exception is teachers/nurses/social workers, who are typically employed by state-owned
organizations, and who exhibit the highest number of paychecks owed.  
In general, wage arrears are rather common among respondents working at state-owned
enterprises and enterprises in bad financial health.  The probability of wage non-payment and wage19
debt tend to be greater in locales where unemployment rates are high, a result likely due to adverse
economic conditions in the region combined with a greater willingness by workers to tolerate wage
arrears because of limited local employment alternatives.  
Many worker characteristics, such as age, marital status, and education, seem not to matter
in the allocation of wage debt, once we control for other factors.  Gender is important, however. 
Both the probability of being owed wages and the size of the wage debt tend to be smaller among
women.  Not surprisingly, wage debt accumulation is greater among respondents who have worked
at the same workplace for many years.  This result is consistent with a strong positive relationship
between current non-payment and the arrears situation in the previous period.  Specifically, other
things being equal, if a worker is owed wages in the previous period, then the probability that this
worker will be owed wages in the current period is higher by about 0.33.  Moreover, there is
evidence suggesting that wage debt is expected to grow larger if the size of the debt is already big.
In this sense, workers fall into a wage arrears trap, from which it is difficult to escape. 
One primary objective is to evaluate the influence of perceived demand on managers’
allocation of wage arrears.  Estimates of the partial effects of our perceived demand measures on
wage arrears are reported in Table 7.  We hypothesized that managers would not consider
perceived demand in their allocation of current wage non-payment (notpaid).  We find, however,
that perceived demand, as measured by job insecurity fears, has a small but significant effect on
managerial behavior.  As expected, perceived demand is more important in the allocation of wage
debt than in the allocation of current non-payment.  The estimated partial effects are small, but
statistically significant, suggesting that the probability of being owed wages and the size of the
wage debt tend to be smaller among workers with higher perceived demand. 
We note that in all specifications the effect of job insecurity (PCVDMD1) is greater than
the effect of having valuable skills (PCVDMD2).  Our estimates show that the probability of being
owed wages is by 0.014 smaller if a worker’s PCVDMD2 is one standard deviation greater than the
sample average.  The effect of PCVDMD1 is twice as big in 1995-2001, but becomes small and
insignificant in 2002-2004.  Similarly, the expected number of monthly paychecks owed is reduced
by about 0.05 if PCVDMD1 exceeds the sample mean by one standard deviation.  The effect of the
PCVDMD2 measure is about 40% less.  Our results support the general finding in psychology that
avoiding negative consequences appears to have a bigger influence on behavior than considering
positive consequences – consider the reaction to having one’s consumption reduced by half as a Payt was obtained from responses to the following question: Tell me, please, in the last 12 months how
21
much was your average monthly wage after taxes from this organization – regardless of whether it was paid to you
on time or not?  If you have worked there for less than 12 months, what has been your average monthly wage for the
time you have worked there?  If you receive all or part of your wage in foreign currency, please convert that to
rubles and report the total amount paid.
20
result of (a) saving, or (b) theft.   
We interpret the negative relationship between perceived demand and wage arrears as likely
reflecting that workers with high perceived demand are more productive and managers choose to
reward these workers by refraining from allocating wage non-payment, or, if that fails, placing high
priority on reducing their wage debt.  Another possible explanation relates to job change decisions
by workers, which we analyze next. 
VI.  Perceived Demand and Worker Response to Wage Arrears
Do Russian workers use job change as a coping strategy for avoiding wage arrears?  To
study this issue we estimate the job change equation using probit regression:
where
Newjob is a binary variable equal to one if the worker changed employers between the current
period and the next period this worker was observed, while the explanatory variables are from the
current period.  We utilize the same economy variables from the wage arrears equation: region,
unemployment rate, settlement type, and year, as well as the same firm variables: financial
condition, ownership.  In addition to the individual variables used in the wage arrears equation:
age, gender, marital status, education, job tenure, occupation, and wage arrears experience, we
include a measure of wages, payt.  Variable payt is the “contractual wage” described by Earle and
Sabirianova (2002); payt is used in place of the actual wage to avoid problems associated with zero
or partially reported wages when wages are not paid on time.   Because the contractual wage is not
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available in RLMS before 1998 and we need to observe all explanatory variables prior to job
change, we estimate the equations using 2000-2004 job change data.  Similarly to the arrears
regressions, we allow the perceived demand effects to vary over time, but impose time-invariant
restrictions on the other coefficients.  We estimate the model using both perceived demand
measures.  Summary statistics of the variables used in these regressions are provided in Appendix.
Job Change Regression Results
Our estimates are reported in Table 8.  As seen in Table 8, the highest probability of job21
change is observed in 2000 (shortly after the financial crisis), and it stabilizes in subsequent years. 
Respondents residing in urban areas and in the Central region tend to change jobs less often, and
worker turnover is greater in occupations closest to cash transactions (clerical/sales/services) and
manual occupations.  Employees working in state-owned enterprises tend to be more attached to
their jobs, as do older workers, workers with longer previous job tenure, and women.  As expected,
local unemployment rate is negatively related to the probability of job change – the higher the local
unemployment rate, the fewer the alternative job opportunities for any given worker, and the more
likely that workers will remain attached to their existing job/workplace.
Both current non-payment and the presence of wage debt increase the probability of job
change in the subsequent period.  The effect is from 0.02 to 0.05, depending upon the specification. 
In contrast, workers are more reluctant to quit their job if their wage debt is large, since in this case
the wage loss due to moving to another workplace is also large (workers forfeit the entirety of the
wage debt).   Similarly, job change becomes less likely as the contractual wage rises.  Overall,
these findings provide evidence in support of our hypothesis that workers use job change as a
means to escape from the wage arrears trap.  The incidence of wage non-payment creates
additional motivation to look for a better job.
Table 9 displays estimated partial effects of our perceived demand measures on the
probability of job change.  Both measures tend to have significant positive effects, implying that
higher perceived demand is associated with a higher probability of job change.  We note that the
negative measure of perceived demand (job insecurity) has a somewhat larger influence than the
positive measure (many valued skills).  That is, the probability of job change is 0.015 higher if
PCVDMD2 is one standard deviation greater than the sample average.  The relationship is stable
over the 2000-2003 period, although it becomes insignificant (and negative) in 2004.  The
corresponding effect of PCVDMD1 ranges from 0.01 to 0.025, depending on specification and
year.  Generally, perceived demand has a bigger influence on worker behavior than the worker’s
educational attainment or local labor market conditions (as measured by the unemployment rate).
We conclude that (1) the incidence of wage arrears is associated with a higher probability
of job change, and (2) workers with high perceived demand are more likely to change jobs.  Thus,
workers who believe that they have valuable skills demanded in the market (that is, workers who
are expected to be of greater value to their employers) have more incentive to leave, and one way
to keep these workers is to pay them their wages on time and/or reduce their wage debt.  This is22
consistent with our finding that arrears tend to be lower among workers with high perceived
demand.
VII.  Summary and Conclusions
Using the most recent RLMS data, we analyze the wage arrears phenomenon in Russia. 
Like studies based on data collected before 2002, we find that arrears are more common among
workers employed by firms in bad financial condition, and in locales where unemployment rates
are high.  Indeed, regional differences are pronounced.  The probability of experiencing wage
arrears is greater among workers employed in state-owned organizations, and among those living
in rural, as opposed to urban, settlements.  Worker characteristics tend not to explain the incidence
or duration of wage arrears; gender is only exception.  Job tenure has a small positive effect and
certain occupations exhibit lower arrears (managers/professionals, skilled technical/administrative,
and clerical/sales/service).  In short, updating wage arrears analyses using more recent data does
little more than confirm results generated in previous studies.  Much about the wage arrears
phenomenon remains to be explained.
Our primary contribution is to investigate the link between perceptions and behavior using
the wage arrears phenomenon in Russia as our case study.  We develop two measures of perceived
demand – a worker’s perception of his/her ‘marketability’ – and evaluate the influence of perceived
demand on the behavior of managers and workers.  In particular, was ask whether managers
behave differently with regard to the allocation of current wage non-payment and wage debt, and
whether or not perceived demand influences the allocation behavior.   We find that arrears tend to
be lower among workers with high perceived demand, and this effect is particularly large in the
case of wage debt.  We explain this finding by managers’ and workers’ optimizing behavior. 
Specifically, we argue that workers with high perceived demand are more likely to quite their jobs
to avoid arrears, so the optimal strategy for managers is to avoid allocating or reduce wage arrears
to such workers, and, in effect, lessen the cost associated with losing valuable employees.
We test our hypothesis by analyzing the determinants of job change.  We ask whether
workers behave differently in response to wage non-payment and wage debt, and estimate the
influence of perceived demand on their behavior.  We find that workers with high perceived
demand change jobs more often.  Additionally, both current non-payment and wage debt are
associated with a higher probability of job change, although this probability declines as the size of
the wage debt increases.  Thus, by reducing wage arrears to workers with high perceived demand,23
managers can make current employment more attractive to these workers and motivate them to stay
on their jobs.  This finding supports our hypothesis about he optimizing behavior of both managers
and workers.
Our analysis suggests that the probability of falling into the wage arrears trap is lower for
workers with high perceived demand.  Our findings show that neither education nor job tenure help
to reduce or avoid wage debt.  Rather, ‘marketability’ matters.
We expected to find that managers allocate current wage non-payment across workers
independently from considerations of ‘marketability,’ and then follow up with a wage debt
reduction strategy that targets most valuable workers.  That is, we hypothesized that perceived
demand would not influence current non-payment, but would influence wage debt reduction.  We
also hypothesized that our two measures of perceived demand would perform equally well.  We
found that our job insecurity measure (PCVDMD1) routinely had a greater influence than our
many valued skills measure (PCVDMD2), and that managers considered perceived demand in all
instances of wage arrears allocation.  Perhaps Russian managers know that research conducted in
developed market economies suggests that most workers feel they are compensated unfairly,
regardless of managerial efforts to satisfy distributive justice criteria in pay allocations (Heneman
and Judge 2000), so they simply avoid this strategy and allocate wages and wages arrears in a way
that focuses on retaining their good (‘marketable’) workers.  
Establishing a link between perceptions and behavior is not new.  Developing a more
detailed explanation of the wage arrears phenomenon is new: (1) we consider alternative wage
arrears measures, and allow workers and managers to behave differently with regard to these
measures, and (2) we proposed a specific measure of ‘marketability’ and evaluate its influence. 
Given the growing literature in behavioral economics, perhaps more detailed surveys of worker
attitudes and personality traits will be conducted in both developed market economies and
transition economies so that our understanding of the ways in which perceptions and ‘soft skills’
affect labor market outcomes is further enhanced.  We view this analysis as one step in the
thousand mile journey.
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1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Wage Arrears
not paid Pct 23.5 27.6 37.1 31.8 19.4 16.2 15.3 13.0 10.0
owed Pct 46.5 49.0 65.4 69.0 37.0 31.5 29.0 25.6 20.2
paychecks Mean 2.74 2.93 3.46 4.91 4.27 2.84 2.82 20.93 2.46
RLMS obs N 4528 4202 4050 3941 4155 4733 4952 5076 5157Table 2:  Arrears by region, firm characteristics, 1994-2004
Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N
Region
Northern and north western 27.6 337 53.4 335 3.03 314 27.3 333 57.1 331 2.22 304 35.4 305 73.4 304 3.48 280
North Caucasian 29.3 529 47.7 518 2.69 484 33.7 496 52.0 492 2.99 445 50.5 487 73.3 479 3.48 438
Ural 19.3 678 46.4 670 2.45 626 21.1 639 45.8 625 2.06 586 31.4 624 67.6 605 2.85 562
Central and central black-earth 22.2 839 42.8 830 2.80 777 21.2 753 39.6 739 2.61 697 28.1 743 54.6 724 3.06 679
Volga-Vaytski and Volga basin 24.9 776 48.0 752 2.65 701 33.4 721 57.1 708 2.94 659 45.2 697 71.7 685 3.78 634
Western Siberian 28.7 432 49.8 428 3.38 395 40.1 411 58.3 408 4.76 356 43.3 404 72.4 398 4.28 357
Eastern Siberian and far eastern 29.5 454 60.6 442 2.58 407 35.9 434 59.3 420 3.33 380 49.2 413 76.0 408 3.83 369
Metropolitan: Moscow/St. Petersburg 10.2 479 28.8 467 2.48 443 10.5 410 26.9 405 2.50 376 12.9 365 34.5 354 2.73 342
Settlement type
Urban 20.0 680 41.6 1382 2.46 486 23.3 713 44.0 1322 2.30 483 31.1 913 61.6 1763 3.04 455
Rural 34.1 385 61.3 685 3.29 171 39.1 445 62.5 702 4.09 157 52.9 586 75.4 826 4.41 116
Local unemployment rate
<6% 21.2 99 39.2 177 2.21 60 35.9 69 79.6 144 3.09 37
6-10% 22.4 844 46.2 1703 2.78 549 22.6 560 42.7 1040 2.42 367 28.6 563 56.3 1085 3.02 276
>10% 39.9 122 61.7 187 2.88 48 35.9 562 60.4 930 3.50 258 47.4 829 76.4 1305 3.93 235
Ownership
State 24.2 671 48.3 1331 2.65 438 27.1 642 49.4 1169 2.84 397 39.1 866 67.7 1496 3.21 351
Russian 19.1 132 38.6 266 2.80 88 25.5 237 44.1 409 2.69 128 32.3 313 60.3 584 3.77 127
Foreign 17.4 25 38.0 54 3.51 12 22.9 35 40.5 62 3.08 26 25.9 36 55.0 77 2.74 26
Enterprise size
1-30 employees 24.4 449 45.9 839 2.88 250 26.6 408 46.4 708 2.96 228 36.5 557 61.8 940 3.39 213
31-200 employees 22.4 204 45.5 413 2.79 134 28.5 198 53.8 373 3.33 114 37.5 250 73.2 485 3.90 112
201-1000 employees 17.8 138 47.6 366 2.74 121 25.4 150 50.9 301 2.55 107 31.1 155 66.9 335 3.58 65
Financial health
Ok 17.0 490 37.1 1043 2.49 406 21.6 597 42.7 1179 2.64 454 30.0 749 57.8 1441 3.00 403
Bad 30.7 376 62.7 763 3.05 199 39.0 338 63.2 541 3.66 129 51.6 494 82.6 786 4.43 109
TOTAL
not paid owed paychecks
1994 1995
not paid owed paychecks
1996
not paid owed paychecksTable 2:  Arrears by region, firm characteristics, 1994-2004
Region
Northern and north western
North Caucasian
Ural
Central and central black-earth
Volga-Vaytski and Volga basin
Western Siberian
Eastern Siberian and far eastern
Metropolitan: Moscow/St. Petersburg
Settlement type
Urban
Rural
Local unemployment rate
<6%
6-10%
>10%
Ownership
State
Russian
Foreign
Enterprise size
1-30 employees
31-200 employees
201-1000 employees
Financial health
Ok
Bad
TOTAL
Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N
27.1 306 78.1 297 4.44 275 16.4 330 40.9 320 3.35 274 20.3 359 40.4 349 2.77 303
41.2 442 70.8 424 5.21 386 23.9 460 40.1 431 5.55 383 18.2 473 29.6 442 3.09 389
27.1 635 70.8 602 4.30 556 13.3 693 30.2 650 2.93 591 13.5 727 27.9 675 2.35 614
24.8 767 61.0 734 4.05 685 15.0 813 32.0 772 2.74 711 10.4 852 26.7 808 1.92 750
39.5 716 77.5 697 5.57 644 22.0 759 38.5 729 4.48 648 22.3 790 39.3 761 3.23 671
38.0 389 75.1 373 6.63 317 32.9 435 52.0 417 6.79 350 29.9 401 50.7 381 4.28 312
37.3 386 74.1 375 4.86 325 21.4 439 42.4 413 4.28 368 16.8 549 35.1 439 2.33 397
16.8 292 38.4 284 3.74 264 9.9 223 18.7 214 2.83 197 7.3 670 14.8 650 2.62 606
27.7 789 66.4 1819 4.28 328 13.6 404 30.8 859 3.10 311 12.1 421 25.8 853 2.39 336
42.8 462 76.0 794 6.44 105 33.6 400 52.1 601 5.93 111 27.7 347 47.2 565 3.56 142
15.4 29 36.4 67 4.33 19 14.5 20 19.5 26 3.70 7 8.4 93 19.9 212 2.11 81
20.3 68 50.2 165 2.78 53 16.0 308 34.0 629 3.38 224 16.9 424 33.5 779 3.08 278
33.8 1154 72.7 2381 5.07 361 22.8 476 41.0 805 5.05 191 22.7 251 38.7 407 2.71 119
32.7 668 73.5 1500 4.52 242 20.4 423 39.7 824 4.39 233 17.1 391 34.0 774 3.00 259
29.3 291 59.2 587 5.40 109 16.9 191 29.8 337 3.93 114 14.9 224 26.7 339 2.49 154
20.1 30 49.3 74 4.68 20 7.8 14 21.7 39 2.21 19 8.3 16 18.2 35 3.48 13
29.0 425 62.9 921 4.77 153 20.3 317 35.5 553 4.76 139 15.7 286 30.8 559 3.08 189
36.3 250 73.4 504 5.38 80 20.6 152 42.7 315 4.93 112 15.5 132 32.7 279 3.07 108
27.2 148 68.4 373 5.07 66 12.0 76 29.5 186 3.17 67 12.2 90 27.2 201 2.08 85
24.7 562 62.0 1408 4.08 285 11.9 319 27.7 744 3.67 287 10.8 349 24.8 802 2.54 341
41.5 444 80.2 846 6.40 113 37.1 270 58.8 423 6.08 83 28.8 205 47.7 335 3.98 79
1998
not paid owed paychecks
2000
not paid owed paychecks
2001
not paid owed paychecksTable 2:  Arrears by region, firm characteristics, 1994-2004
Region
Northern and north western
North Caucasian
Ural
Central and central black-earth
Volga-Vaytski and Volga basin
Western Siberian
Eastern Siberian and far eastern
Metropolitan: Moscow/St. Petersburg
Settlement type
Urban
Rural
Local unemployment rate
<6%
6-10%
>10%
Ownership
State
Russian
Foreign
Enterprise size
1-30 employees
31-200 employees
201-1000 employees
Financial health
Ok
Bad
TOTAL
Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N
19.0 366 40.7 354 1.75 305 17.2 360 34.7 349 1.88 305 11.0 356 22.3 336 1.72 311
17.8 483 30.0 447 2.65 398 17.8 501 27.7 465 3.10 413 11.8 525 20.4 485 2.80 447
10.7 717 19.8 676 2.39 626 9.9 784 19.6 723 2.14 664 8.6 802 15.9 741 2.24 686
11.6 686 25.0 837 2.01 783 10.0 901 22.1 842 2.29 486 6.8 883 16.8 832 2.08 799
17.9 875 34.3 846 3.33 779 13.3 860 27.6 812 3.56 749 11.5 851 22.0 803 2.85 735
28.1 413 47.4 392 5.42 335 22.0 432 44.3 400 5.15 363 15.3 444 38.4 409 3.26 368
20.9 460 40.4 436 1.71 386 18.7 497 34.2 468 1.61 423 13.4 522 27.1 487 1.72 445
6.8 768 12.9 737 2.38 705 5.6 738 11.8 710 2.02 678 6.5 769 10.9 750 2.44 709
11.7 430 24.7 865 2.00 385 10.1 380 21.6 766 2.06 323 7.8 301 17.2 627 2.21 225
25.7 328 41.4 503 4.23 138 21.6 282 37.6 457 4.38 110 16.9 215 29.7 353 2.88 109
8.4 116 16.5 219 2.27 95 7.5 113 15.8 228 1.92 89 7.8 129 14.0 224 2.10 75
18.7 492 34.4 860 3.23 307 12.3 160 22.8 277 2.50 83 10.5 266 22.5 527 2.73 170
15.9 150 32.3 289 2.04 121 17.3 374 33.9 388 3.41 250 13.1 111 25.8 207 2.21 77
17.3 408 32.4 762 2.63 305 13.8 310 27.5 616 2.87 235 10.6 225 21.7 460 2.40 172
12.7 222 24.1 420 2.95 171 11.6 214 22.8 421 3.13 157 8.1 164 16.6 336 2.50 124
7.0 16 14.1 33 1.22 15 8.2 15 13.1 24 2.25 9 7.3 13 10.1 18 1.29 5
15.6 314 28.1 565 2.83 221 11.6 236 23.7 483 2.97 183 9.0 182 18.2 369 2.35 135
16.1 140 32.1 297 3.58 108 13.8 111 27.6 222 3.55 87 10.0 84 24.2 203 2.46 84
11.0 84 25.7 197 1.99 87 9.2 61 23.1 153 2.24 67 6.7 46 16.8 116 2.37 46
10.6 374 22.9 808 2.49 385 8.1 288 18.9 670 2.60 320 5.5 208 14.5 545 2.07 224
29.1 208 46.4 324 4.15 85 25.1 157 43.6 267 4.27 59 20.4 119 37.7 212 3.31 58
2002
not paid owed paychecks
2003
not paid owed paychecks
2004
not paid owed paychecksTable 3: Arrears by Worker Characteristics, 1994-2004
Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N
Gender
Male 27.1 595 51.0 1095 2.82 936 31.1 632 52.6 1049 3.15 892 40.2 778 68.1 1288 3.86 1136
Female 20.2 470 42.4 972 2.65 836 24.3 526 45.7 975 2.68 807 34.3 721 63.0 1301 3.08 1155
Age
15-24 29.2 157 46.0 241 2.70 174 31.2 163 45.9 235 2.30 157 39.9 196 61.3 287 2.95 235
25-39 22.8 440 48.3 915 2.78 784 27.0 463 50.1 841 3.01 699 36.1 590 66.6 1067 3.50 941
40-54 22.7 355 46.7 716 2.71 645 27.0 400 50.3 737 2.90 663 36.9 530 65.2 920 3.38 827
over 54 22.6 113 39.6 195 2.70 169 27.5 132 44.8 211 3.24 180 38.2 183 66.3 315 4.02 288
Education
Secondary degree or less 27.5 198 49.1 345 2.74 286 30.4 260 49.7 415 3.67 331 41.1 323 67.4 515 3.54 457
Vocational degree 28.0 487 51.4 879 2.84 742 32.4 489 53.2 789 2.97 665 42.6 617 69.3 987 3.80 856
University degree 18.4 380 41.5 843 2.64 744 22.3 408 45.3 819 2.53 702 30.9 557 61.4 1085 3.13 976
Occupation
Managers & professionals 15.4 103 39.3 258 2.73 240 19.5 116 39.6 233 3.01 203 29.1 150 60.1 309 3.28 278
Skilled technical & 18.5 108 39.8 229 2.53 196 18.5 102 39.9 217 2.58 182 30.1 165 60.4 323 2.87 281
Clerical, sales, service 17.7 94 35.6 181 2.54 143 20.7 115 36.1 193 3.07 138 24.3 129 48.7 242 3.04 213
Teachers, nurses, social 18.4 74 42.3 169 2.16 143 27.8 100 52.5 187 2.02 160 41.1 158 73.8 282 2.58 257
Skilled manual 27.2 246 50.7 450 2.39 376 31.0 233 53.4 395 2.55 339 40.9 290 71.1 495 3.68 446
Semi-skilled manual 27.7 241 55.2 473 3.23 421 36.4 302 60.0 490 3.30 415 44.2 350 72.1 561 4.11 493
Unskilled manual 35.3 199 55.0 307 3.05 250 34.2 190 56.5 309 3.47 262 45.9 257 67.9 377 3.85 323
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure 27.8 207 42.4 309 2.21 222 30.9 227 45.7 326 2.19 221 36.3 248 59.5 385 2.64 301
1 to 3 years tenure 20.1 170 42.3 349 2.76 297 24.6 206 45.0 369 2.74 311 32.3 263 59.7 475 3.20 426
3 to 10 years tenure 23.8 294 47.8 580 2.80 512 28.5 289 52.6 527 2.92 442 39.4 398 68.3 682 3.63 609
More than 10 years tenure 22.0 332 48.7 728 2.87 674 26.3 315 51.8 615 3.22 567 36.4 389 71.3 760 3.70 708
1994 1995 1996
not paid owed paychecks not paid owed paychecks not paid owed paychecksTable 3: Arrears by Worker Characteristics, 1994-2004
Gender
Male
Female
Age
15-24
25-39
40-54
over 54
Education
Secondary degree or less
Vocational degree
University degree
Occupation
Managers & professionals
Skilled technical &
Clerical, sales, service
Teachers, nurses, social
Skilled manual
Semi-skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure
1 to 3 years tenure
3 to 10 years tenure
More than 10 years tenure
Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N
33.6 621 70.0 1244 5.42 1076 20.8 402 39.9 729 4.71 5.36 16.8 372 33.0 699 3.11 474
30.2 630 68.1 1369 4.45 1203 18.1 402 34.5 731 3.80 500 15.7 396 30.1 719 2.57 481
32.1 161 67.5 310 4.04 240 24.4 138 39.4 207 2.43 110 20.7 136 33.7 204 2.17 117
31.9 488 69.6 1026 5.02 897 20.1 323 38.3 578 4.59 393 16.4 302 31.6 553 2.57 353
31.3 468 68.6 1007 4.87 895 18.0 297 36.6 583 4.42 466 15.6 290 32.3 580 3.32 429
33.8 134 70.3 270 5.48 247 14.1 46 28.7 92 4.45 67 10.9 40 22.7 81 2.23 56
38.4 244 75.1 456 5.15 389 23.5 160 39.0 253 4.61 167 19.8 157 35.7 272 2.51 175
35.1 512 70.4 987 5.19 847 22.7 351 41.8 607 4.48 428 19.7 338 37.0 589 3.11 388
27.0 493 65.8 1163 4.58 1038 15.3 293 32.5 600 3.94 441 12.2 270 25.9 553 2.72 391
23.6 127 60.5 319 5.03 290 15.4 95 30.1 180 3.83 133 10.2 81 24.1 187 2.63 142
26.0 148 68.5 383 4.03 346 14.6 80 28.9 155 3.56 116 13.4 85 27.0 169 2.75 108
26.3 137 54.0 251 4.66 202 17.2 109 30.9 170 3.60 100 13.3 92 23.2 139 2.67 88
33.4 142 79.0 331 4.14 302 16.8 67 38.3 152 5.42 113 15.1 65 33.2 142 3.43 102
35.7 220 72.3 425 4.80 368 18.1 115 38.7 232 4.49 169 18.3 125 34.1 221 2.15 147
36.4 275 74.1 547 5.73 465 23.7 191 42.9 332 4.31 252 19.0 167 37.8 319 2.74 211
39.8 202 72.9 357 5.58 306 28.5 147 48.6 239 4.49 153 24.9 153 41.3 241 3.56 157
35.9 233 65.5 389 3.21 316 25.8 214 41.0 306 2.72 170 22.1 213 36.4 319 2.10 171
26.7 231 63.3 519 4.57 461 17.6 155 35.6 287 3.63 204 14.9 148 28.9 268 2.71 191
28.9 319 68.5 737 5.02 645 17.2 210 34.4 409 4.57 305 13.5 175 28.1 351 2.79 248
31.6 315 73.4 723 5.50 652 17.3 137 38.0 365 5.23 300 14.3 167 32.8 382 3.29 299
1998 2000 2001
not paid owed paychecks not paid owed paychecks not paid owed paychecksTable 3: Arrears by Worker Characteristics, 1994-2004
Gender
Male
Female
Age
15-24
25-39
40-54
over 54
Education
Secondary degree or less
Vocational degree
University degree
Occupation
Managers & professionals
Skilled technical &
Clerical, sales, service
Teachers, nurses, social
Skilled manual
Semi-skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure
1 to 3 years tenure
3 to 10 years tenure
More than 10 years tenure
Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N Pct N Pct N Mean N
14.8 337 30.1 650 3.09 485 13.1 305 27.3 594 3.16 431 10.3 246 22.4 499 2.69 338
15.7 421 28.0 718 2.55 475 13.0 357 24.3 629 2.68 404 9.8 270 18.4 481 2.19 299
23.0 161 33.9 223 2.09 123 19.1 132 30.1 193 2.17 106 16.3 112 25.8 163 1.72 76
14.3 273 29.0 522 2.50 360 12.7 253 25.9 476 2.73 306 9.3 196 20.0 389 2.15 237
14.5 280 28.2 527 3.38 399 12.2 240 24.9 468 3.28 358 8.6 164 19.4 354 2.94 268
10.8 44 24.4 96 2.65 78 8.8 37 21.1 86 3.14 65 9.8 44 16.9 74 2.46 56
19.0 152 31.5 237 3.09 157 16.4 134 28.8 217 3.73 139 13.7 111 24.9 186 2.59 112
18.1 321 32.9 552 2.91 376 15.0 279 30.3 518 2.83 364 11.4 213 22.9 397 2.74 259
12.1 285 25.3 579 2.65 427 10.4 248 21.2 487 2.69 332 7.8 192 16.8 397 2.13 266
10.8 83 24.9 188 3.73 142 10.5 76 20.9 150 2.75 106 6.5 48 15.1 108 2.32 85
11.5 85 23.4 169 2.49 125 12.0 85 23.0 158 2.33 111 7.7 58 18.7 137 2.48 91
13.3 100 22.1 147 2.26 80 12.9 110 21.8 158 2.50 82 8.4 68 15.3 106 1.88 52
17.5 77 32.1 140 1.99 95 9.5 45 24.9 118 3.08 85 9.0 43 17.5 83 1.81 53
14.5 102 30.6 202 2.32 153 13.1 93 27.2 180 2.52 124 8.5 64 19.3 134 2.12 86
17.5 158 33.9 295 2.90 210 14.5 131 29.9 253 3.24 189 12.9 125 26.8 244 3.13 163
23.8 153 37.0 227 3.46 155 17.5 122 31.3 206 3.64 138 16.8 110 27.1 168 2.38 107
22.5 229 35.9 337 1.82 206 19.5 209 31.4 297 2.05 171 15.4 163 26.1 249 1.46 135
13.4 148 25.7 269 2.27 176 11.3 126 24.4 251 2.36 182 7.6 83 17.2 174 2.48 117
11.5 158 25.6 337 2.34 256 9.5 133 21.8 293 2.74 204 8.7 136 17.1 250 2.42 150
14.2 161 29.8 336 4.30 269 11.4 129 26.1 292 3.96 235 8.8 109 21.0 256 3.01 204
2002 2003 2004
not paid owed paychecks owed paychecks not paid owed paychecks not paidTable 4a: Perceived demand composite measure, by round, by worker characteristics
low high low high low high low high
PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N 
Gender
Male 42.8 11.9 7.39 2108 46.1 10.4 7.16 1950 49.1 9.3 6.92 1819 57.8 5.6 6.28 1714
Female 59.2 4.8 6.16 2257 59.0 5.6 6.19 2084 61.6 4.9 6.03 1995 70.5 3.0 5.43 1953
Age
15-24 38.9 12.1 7.65 514 40.2 10.3 7.41 497 42.5 8.0 7.22 449 51.8 7.9 6.83 440
25-39 51.7 7.5 6.73 1872 53.4 7.3 6.65 1645 54.2 6.8 6.56 1547 61.7 4.1 5.95 1427
40-54 55.2 7.9 6.46 1504 55.4 7.8 6.50 1443 60.2 7.0 6.17 1370 71.5 2.9 5.40 1431
over 54 50.7 8.0 6.78 475 56.1 8.0 6.41 449 60.3 6.2 6.17 448 63.7 4.9 5.80 369
Education
Secondary degree or less 56.4 6.9 6.43 684 57.0 6.1 6.28 819 59.8 4.2 6.14 732 66.9 3.6 5.62 587
Vocational degree 53.5 6.8 6.55 1678 55.0 6.1 6.47 1451 58.4 6.4 6.20 1367 68.3 3.6 5.62 1347
University degree 47.7 9.9 7.03 2003 49.0 10.2 6.99 1760 51.7 8.6 6.79 1713 60.8 4.9 6.05 1723
Occupation
Managers & professionals 44.7 11.9 7.23 646 47.6 12.2 7.20 574 46.3 9.7 7.17 497 53.7 7.2 5.45 512
Skilled technical & 50.0 9.6 6.90 570 48.6 8.5 6.87 527 56.2 7.0 6.48 516 66.8 3.8 5.69 548
Clerical, sales, service 60.4 4.9 6.04 505 58.2 5.2 6.16 519 62.0 3.8 5.91 474 68.4 3.3 5.56 450
Teachers, nurses, social 45.2 6.8 7.12 394 50.1 9.6 6.99 353 53.8 9.3 6.72 364 61.5 4.2 6.00 400
Skilled manual 48.0 9.6 7.00 586 50.3 9.4 6.91 730 52.9 7.2 6.55 667 61.8 5.3 6.07 568
Semi-skilled manual 52.7 7.3 6.66 847 55.1 6.4 6.42 800 57.4 6.7 6.31 758 69.7 2.0 5.05 712
Unskilled manual 59.5 5.5 6.15 541 59.1 4.3 6.17 531 60.6 5.8 6.12 538 67.9 4.2 5.59 477
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure 48.1 10.9 7.11 717 48.9 10.1 7.90 693 46.3 10.3 7.06 622 56.0 6.3 6.39 575
1 to 3 years tenure 42.6 11.9 7.35 808 45.0 9.5 7.15 802 50.4 7.4 6.73 768 59.4 5.5 6.16 799
3 to 10 years tenure 51.9 6.9 6.64 1198 53.5 7.9 6.66 978 55.2 7.5 6.54 977 66.2 3.8 5.72 1041
More than 10 years tenure 56.4 6.0 6.38 1465 57.2 7.3 10.33 1166 62.3 5.4 6.01 1033 70.5 2.9 5.39 948
Arrears Status
Received wage payment 59.6 9.1 6.91 3333 50.3 8.8 6.85 2915 51.6 8.3 6.73 2390 62.9 4.8 5.95 2488
Wage non payment 56.7 5.2 6.23 1029 59.5 5.4 6.18 1115 62.5 4.8 5.99 1417 68.0 3.0 5.55 1175
No wage debt 46.3 9.9 7.11 2330 49.0 9.6 6.96 2063 47.3 9.3 7.03 1320 60.1 5.3 6.16 1154
Wage debt 57.1 6.4 6.33 2013 56.8 6.1 6.35 1961 60.1 5.8 6.15 2478 66.5 3.7 5.67 2511
Total 51.3 8.2 6.75 4365 52.8 7.9 6.66 4034
1994 1995 1996 1998
Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand
low = score of 6 of less (of 15)
high = score of 12 or more (of 15)Table 4a: Perceived demand composite measure, by round, by worker characteristics
Gender
Male
Female
Age
15-24
25-39
40-54
over 54
Education
Secondary degree or less
Vocational degree
University degree
Occupation
Managers & professionals
Skilled technical &
Clerical, sales, service
Teachers, nurses, social
Skilled manual
Semi-skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure
1 to 3 years tenure
3 to 10 years tenure
More than 10 years tenure
Arrears Status
Received wage payment
Wage non payment
No wage debt
Wage debt
Total
low high low high low high low high
PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N 
41.0 10.6 7.42 1753 31.8 15.4 8.20 2041 33.9 15.0 8.04 2117 33.6 14.2 8.05 2093
52.3 6.7 6.64 2043 44.1 10.5 7.29 2325 43.3 11.4 7.36 2503 43.3 10.3 7.36 2515
35.3 13.9 7.88 496 27.8 17.8 8.43 580 25.0 19.1 8.60 628 25.1 16.7 8.60 606
42.8 10.4 7.30 1449 34.9 14.8 7.97 1694 35.5 13.8 7.89 1770 33.8 13.9 8.02 1780
54.9 5.6 6.46 1534 45.5 9.8 7.24 1747 45.9 10.9 7.25 1840 47.6 9.2 7.11 1831
47.6 5.0 6.91 317 36.5 10.4 7.69 345 44.2 9.9 7.18 382 42.5 10.5 7.32 391
48.7 5.8 6.77 620 44.2 9.8 7.28 735 42.1 12.8 7.49 729 40.9 11.1 7.50 721
47.8 6.9 6.88 1378 37.7 11.9 7.73 1531 38.6 13.1 7.67 1642 38.7 11.2 7.64 1647
46.0 10.6 7.18 1798 36.7 14.6 7.86 2086 38.2 13.2 7.73 2242 38.4 13.1 7.76 2239
43.3 12.6 7.41 587 32.8 15.1 8.12 754 32.2 15.1 8.03 746 35.4 15.6 8.09 692
46.6 11.1 7.17 521 38.3 15.1 7.81 614 38.8 12.4 7.70 704 39.4 13.4 7.72 673
50.0 7.3 6.77 522 41.4 9.3 7.43 579 36.0 14.9 7.82 642 40.4 10.7 7.48 693
47.4 7.9 6.98 390 40.3 15.3 7.70 419 41.3 13.0 7.52 424 40.8 12.7 7.72 466
43.1 9.7 7.28 564 32.6 14.9 8.15 631 39.7 14.7 7.80 648 32.7 13.4 8.00 633
51.1 6.1 6.66 742 42.3 10.0 7.32 816 44.9 9.9 7.17 851 42.8 8.1 7.24 823
47.4 4.5 6.78 470 41.9 10.7 7.44 553 36.2 12.1 7.72 605 40.3 11.9 7.61 628
41.1 12.7 7.54 706 29.8 16.5 8.31 835 31.8 15.8 7.17 909 31.2 14.0 8.18 900
43.4 9.7 7.32 784 33.7 16.1 8.14 905 34.1 15.2 8.07 1021 32.6 14.0 8.08 989
47.1 7.8 6.96 1148 39.5 12.9 7.68 1213 38.2 14.2 7.74 1297 36.5 13.3 7.84 1322
52.5 5.7 6.54 930 45.3 8.9 7.14 1140 48.4 8.8 6.97 1114 51.8 8.1 6.81 1101
46.3 9.0 7.07 3067 37.5 13.3 7.79 3658 38.3 13.6 7.72 3912 37.8 12.6 7.74 4023
50.5 6.4 6.71 729 42.8 10.6 7.34 706 42.6 10.1 7.38 706 46.2 8.9 7.21 584
45.8 9.4 7.11 2421 36.0 13.6 7.88 3019 37.3 13.7 7.77 3305 37.6 13.0 7.78 3471
49.4 6.8 6.81 1372 43.5 11.0 7.34 1343 43.1 11.4 7.42 1312 43.1 9.4 7.36 1132
2000 2001 2002 2003
Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand
low = score of 6 of less (of 15)
high = score of 12 or more (of 15)Table 4a: Perceived demand composite measure, by round, by worker characteristics
Gender
Male
Female
Age
15-24
25-39
40-54
over 54
Education
Secondary degree or less
Vocational degree
University degree
Occupation
Managers & professionals
Skilled technical &
Clerical, sales, service
Teachers, nurses, social
Skilled manual
Semi-skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure
1 to 3 years tenure
3 to 10 years tenure
More than 10 years tenure
Arrears Status
Received wage payment
Wage non payment
No wage debt
Wage debt
Total
low high
PCT PCT Mean N 
33.6 13.0 8.03 2166
42.4 10.2 7.39 2548
26.0 16.9 8.70 597
33.9 13.8 8.03 1900
46.5 8.2 7.07 1787
41.4 7.2 7.09 430
38.6 11.2 7.73 713
39.5 10.2 7.54 1689
37.4 12.5 7.29 2311
33.5 14.7 8.02 701
37.1 12.4 7.76 715
39.6 9.6 7.53 664
41.4 12.8 7.58 468
32.4 13.1 8.06 679
42.9 7.8 7.29 884
41.8 11.1 7.58 603
32.0 15.1 8.24 925
23.3 13.8 8.13 979
38.6 12.0 7.71 1430
45.7 7.2 6.99 1195
38.1 11.5 7.71 4250
41.2 11.1 7.48 459
37.8 11.4 7.73 3793
40.8 11.9 7.50 912
2004
Perceived demand
low = score of 6 of less (of 15)
high = score of 12 or more (of 15)Table 4b: Perceived Demand (Valued Skills), by worker characteristics, by round
low high low high low high low high
PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N 
Gender
Male 13.1 14.0 2.53 1680 24.4 12.9 2.31 1633 21.0 12.0 2.38 1705 16.3 16.3 2.52 208
Female 20.8 12.0 2.33 1864 30.2 8.0 2.11 1856 27.6 9.4 2.20 1987 21.3 21.3 2.35 2441
Age
15-24 12.9 10.3 2.46 419 20.0 11.6 2.36 440 19.2 13.6 2.47 479 10.3 10.3 2.70 632
25-39 14.9 12.4 2.45 1446 23.5 11.1 2.28 1363 18.7 11.6 2.40 1435 15.1 15.1 2.51 1740
40-54 19.0 14.1 2.41 1270 32.7 8.7 2.10 1336 30.8 9.9 2.16 1478 24.5 11.9 2.28 1760
over 54 23.7 13.9 2.33 409 32.0 12.0 2.14 350 29.7 4.3 2.06 300 26.4 11.2 2.26 367
Education
Secondary degree or less 20.0 14.1 2.38 689 34.5 9.7 2.09 565 27.3 11.4 2.23 597 22.4 12.1 2.36 718
Vocational degree 16.1 12.6 2.42 1213 28.3 11.4 2.20 1253 26.8 10.8 2.25 1336 20.7 14.2 2.38 1568
University degree 16.8 12.7 2.44 1640 24.2 9.8 2.25 1660 21.9 10.2 2.33 1759 16.6 14.8 2.48 2206
Occupation
Managers & professionals 14.9 12.6 2.48 483 21.9 9.9 2.32 503 19.1 12.9 2.45 572 14.6 18.6 2.59 732
Skilled technical & 15.1 12.2 2.49 483 21.2 12.6 2.34 515 20.5 12.2 2.41 493 14.8 16.2 2.55 683
Clerical, sales, service 19.0 10.6 2.37 463 25.7 8.3 2.19 470 23.5 8.8 2.29 565 16.9 12.7 2.45 670
Teachers, nurses, social 21.8 10.1 2.28 348 32.1 8.2 2.07 380 26.4 9.3 2.19 364 19.8 11.5 2.35 408
Skilled manual 14.9 12.8 2.46 611 25.3 12.3 2.27 534 25.6 11.0 2.27 547 20.2 14.9 2.41 624
Semi-skilled manual 16.1 14.9 2.47 678 30.9 10.5 2.16 648 25.1 11.5 2.28 704 20.1 13.2 2.39 809
Unskilled manual 20.7 15.7 2.34 478 36.7 9.3 2.04 439 33.6 7.4 2.05 447 28.6 9.9 2.18 573
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure 19.0 12.7 2.41 600 22.5 11.0 2.30 582 24.2 11.5 2.33 730 15.8 16.0 2.53 920
1 to 3 years tenure 14.4 13.5 2.49 724 23.9 12.0 2.32 767 19.6 13.3 2.45 789 17.3 14.9 2.47 1006
3 to 10 years tenure 16.8 12.1 2.40 906 28.5 10.6 2.18 997 25.8 9.5 2.23 1106 18.2 13.4 2.42 1259
More than 10 years tenure 20.1 13.5 2.39 950 29.7 8.6 2.14 870 28.5 9.1 2.17 856 24.0 12.7 2.29 1043
Arrears Status
Received wage payment 16.4 14.0 2.46 2242 27.1 10.5 2.22 2397 24.2 10.0 2.29 2997 18.6 14.0 2.44 3838
Wage non payment 18.6 11.1 2.36 1292 28.2 9.9 2.17 1087 26.3 13.3 2.28 692 21.4 14.7 2.36 660
No wage debt 13.9 14.8 2.52 1198 24.8 11.8 2.30 1066 23.3 10.2 2.30 2218 18.6 14.0 2.44 3065
Wage debt 18.9 11.9 2.37 2263 29.4 9.4 2.14 2292 27.8 11.2 2.24 1281 20.1 14.1 2.37 1229
Total
2000 2002 1996 1998
Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand
low = score of 1 (of 4)
high  = score of 4 (of 4)Table 4b: Perceived Demand (Valued Skills), by worker characteristics, by round
Gender
Male
Female
Age
15-24
25-39
40-54
over 54
Education
Secondary degree or less
Vocational degree
University degree
Occupation
Managers & professionals
Skilled technical &
Clerical, sales, service
Teachers, nurses, social
Skilled manual
Semi-skilled manual
Unskilled manual
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year tenure
1 to 3 years tenure
3 to 10 years tenure
More than 10 years tenure
Arrears Status
Received wage payment
Wage non payment
No wage debt
Wage debt
Total
low high low high
PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N 
16.2 14.0 2.51 2070 13.9 17.3 2.61 2179
22.3 10.9 2.34 2443 19.4 10.8 2.37 2545
12.2 11.9 2.61 596 9.8 16.5 2.69 611
15.2 14.2 2.53 1793 13.7 16.6 2.60 1929
23.7 11.1 2.30 1753 21.0 10.7 2.33 1756
31.8 10.0 2.14 371 24.3 9.8 2.28 428
25.7 11.1 2.29 703 18.4 11.9 2.41 732
20.9 10.8 2.36 1613 18.7 12.8 2.42 1689
16.4 13.8 2.50 2194 15.0 15.2 2.55 2302
13.0 16.2 2.62 685 11.2 19.1 2.71 703
16.2 15.0 2.54 648 13.1 18.8 2.65 692
18.1 11.3 2.42 750 15.3 13.2 2.48 733
22.9 11.5 2.31 433 19.5 7.1 2.32 452
18.3 10.2 2.40 627 16.7 11.7 2.44 675
21.1 13.2 2.41 778 18.6 13.4 2.43 878
29.0 7.8 2.16 592 25.5 10.5 2.25 591
17.8 12.4 2.45 944 16.0 15.6 2.50 956
17.2 13.2 2.50 989 14.5 15.5 2.56 999
19.1 11.7 2.43 1266 16.8 14.4 2.50 1453
25.0 11.1 2.28 1011 20.2 9.7 2.35 1174
19.2 12.0 2.42 3948 16.3 14.1 2.50 4257
21.6 14.1 2.39 568 22.0 11.2 2.31 463
18.3 12.3 2.45 3165 15.8 14.6 2.51 3545
23.6 12.0 2.31 1075 21.8 11.4 2.34 893
Perceived demand
2003 2004
Perceived demand
low = score of 1 (of 4)
high  = score of 4 (of 4)Table 5a:  Perceived demand composite measure, by round, by region
low high low high low high low high
PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N 
Region
Northern and north western 51.2 7.6 6.69 328 50.1 10.5 6.85 325 52.4 8.5 6.67 294 66.1 3.1 5.83 292
North Caucasian 53.0 6.6 6.69 511 52.0 5.0 6.55 479 55.2 7.2 6.49 460 61.5 4.7 6.06 400
Ural 52.4 8.0 6.70 653 56.8 7.7 6.49 607 61.4 5.0 6.11 575 64.4 3.3 5.73 581
Central and central black-earth 51.0 9.1 6.75 812 52.0 6.6 6.68 725 53.0 5.8 6.49 711 64.3 3.2 5.71 709
Volga-Vaytski and Volga basin 56.7 7.4 6.39 744 60.7 52.0 6.05 694 60.9 5.0 6.06 663 66.7 4.2 5.71 682
Western Siberian 52.7 5.2 6.53 423 49.7 7.3 6.73 396 56.4 5.1 6.33 390 65.3 3.9 5.84 360
Eastern Siberian and far eastern 55.7 5.2 6.35 440 58.7 5.8 6.33 412 61.3 7.2 6.18 377 69.2 3.6 5.54 364
Metropolitan: Moscow/St. Petersburg 33.9 16.3 8.12 454 34.3 19.4 8.21 396 38.1 16.9 7.90 344 55.6 10.0 6.58 279
Settlement type
Urban 49.4 9.1 6.91 3272 51.2 8.9 6.79 2947 54.5 7.8 6.57 2757 64.7 4.5 5.84 2677
Rural 57.1 5.6 6.28 1093 57.2 5.1 6.31 1087 58.8 4.7 6.13 1057 64.0 3.3 5.78 990
Local unemployment rate
<6% 51.6 5.2 6.57 438 77.1 1.7 5.32 179 53.3 12.1 6.86 182
6-10% 51.5 8.8 6.76 3627 50.6 8.6 6.84 2383 50.3 8.3 6.79 1856 45.8 8.4 7.02 321
>10% 48.7 6.0 6.89 300 57.9 6.4 6.28 1506 60.6 6.0 6.13 1657 67.1 3.3 5.64 3164
Ownership
State 53.0 7.2 6.63 2725 53.6 8.5 6.55 2315 57.5 5.8 6.35 2148 64.8 3.8 5.76 2008
Russian 43.4 13.6 7.49 682 47.0 8.7 7.12 916 50.3 9.8 6.83 949 62.9 6.0 6.05 973
Foreign 44.2 11.6 7.43 138 40.1 14.5 7.57 152 44.4 14.8 7.30 135 57.8 4.8 6.35 147
Enterprise size
1-30 employees 50.2 8.0 6.77 1807 52.7 8.5 6.71 1507 55.8 7.7 6.45 1487 63.8 4.6 5.90 1447
31-200 employees 52.7 8.5 6.75 896 51.5 8.7 6.75 678 54.7 5.8 6.45 654 68.4 2.1 5.51 677
201-1000 employees 51.3 8.7 6.77 758 48.3 9.5 7.00 580 52.1 8.3 6.72 491 62.8 5.2 5.94 538
Financial health
Ok 48.3 9.1 6.97 2770 51.1 9.0 6.79 2721 54.0 6.9 6.55 2433 62.9 4.3 5.92 2237
Bad 58.3 5.8 6.22 1202 58.7 74.7 6.22 836 62.7 6.3 6.03 923 69.6 3.9 5.50 1037
1994 1995 1996 1998
Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand Perceived demand
low = score of 6 or less (of 15)
high = score of 12 or more (of 15)Table 5a:  Perceived demand composite measure, by round, by region
Region
Northern and north western
North Caucasian
Ural
Central and central black-earth
Volga-Vaytski and Volga basin
Western Siberian
Eastern Siberian and far eastern
Metropolitan: Moscow/St. Petersburg
Settlement type
Urban
Rural
Local unemployment rate
<6%
6-10%
>10%
Ownership
State
Russian
Foreign
Enterprise size
1-30 employees
31-200 employees
201-1000 employees
Financial health
Ok
Bad
low high low high low high low high
PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N PCT PCT Mean N 
39.4 10.8 7.58 297 31.8 17.0 8.30 324 31.4 19.0 8.32 347 32.4 18.1 8.34 336
46.1 7.4 7.05 403 47.5 8.9 7.10 425 41.4 9.8 7.35 437 42.9 8.8 7.31 445
44.3 8.3 7.14 623 38.7 11.8 7.65 646 41.4 11.1 7.43 660 40.7 9.8 7.45 683
45.2 8.5 7.14 755 36.7 14.5 7.85 791 40.0 11.2 7.50 820 38.7 9.7 7.51 813
55.4 6.0 6.39 700 44.0 10.0 7.26 741 41.5 10.1 7.38 831 41.9 9.4 7.40 795
49.4 10.4 6.99 403 46.5 6.8 7.08 368 46.0 10.2 7.19 374 44.0 10.1 7.36 386
51.1 6.2 6.65 403 39.3 11.1 7.52 432 45.1 10.8 7.26 426 48.2 8.4 6.97 450
35.4 16.5 7.97 212 25.3 20.2 8.75 639 27.6 22.2 8.79 725 25.6 22.9 8.94 700
45.2 9.9 7.18 2695 34.7 14.4 7.97 3211 36.8 15.0 7.88 3437 36.1 14.1 7.93 3449
51.9 5.0 6.57 1101 48.5 8.6 6.99 1155 45.2 7.4 7.06 1183 47.1 6.3 6.93 1159
36.4 14.4 7.72 132 30.2 18.1 8.40 1049 30.7 17.3 8.29 1298 30.2 16.8 8.33 1411
48.3 7.9 6.92 1797 40.6 11.0 7.50 2322 41.5 11.4 7.47 2443 38.4 9.7 7.58 1176
46.7 8.6 7.03 1867 41.6 11.5 7.50 995 44.1 11.5 7.32 879 46.0 10.2 7.23 1941
47.7 7.1 6.89 2023 40.7 11.9 7.52 2207 39.7 12.9 7.60 2312 42.4 11.8 7.50 2186
44.5 11.0 7.32 1104 34.1 14.8 8.07 1470 37.2 13.9 7.84 1718 33.6 13.3 7.97 1809
45.7 11.4 7.09 175 34.2 13.7 7.92 190 33.9 16.7 7.97 227 37.0 16.0 7.91 181
45.0 8.5 7.11 1532 37.1 13.2 7.80 1786 38.9 12.8 7.66 1987 37.8 12.7 7.78 2003
48.7 9.0 6.90 723 40.2 13.2 7.60 836 39.5 10.9 7.53 852 40.2 12.1 7.64 786
48.5 9.4 7.02 618 40.6 13.8 7.65 732 40.9 14.1 7.65 756 38.4 12.1 7.59 651
45.9 8.2 7.07 2624 38.1 13.1 7.24 3165 38.3 13.4 7.72 3481 38.0 12.9 7.76 3482
52.7 6.7 6.60 696 41.3 11.3 7.46 683 42.0 12.0 7.47 690 42.1 10.3 7.33 599
2003
Perceived demand
2002
Perceived demand
2000
Perceived demand Perceived demand
2001
low = score of 6 or less (of 15)
high = score of 12 or more (of 15)Table 5a:  Perceived demand composite measure, by round, by region
Region
Northern and north western
North Caucasian
Ural
Central and central black-earth
Volga-Vaytski and Volga basin
Western Siberian
Eastern Siberian and far eastern
Metropolitan: Moscow/St. Petersburg
Settlement type
Urban
Rural
Local unemployment rate
<6%
6-10%
>10%
Ownership
State
Russian
Foreign
Enterprise size
1-30 employees
31-200 employees
201-1000 employees
Financial health
Ok
Bad
low high
PCT PCT Mean N 
38.0 16.0 8.02 324
44.8 8.6 7.28 466
41.2 9.9 7.51 724
36.2 8.6 7.53 813
42.2 10.6 7.37 784
38.9 10.6 7.53 404
43.3 10.6 7.38 483
26.1 18.2 8.77 716
35.1 13.5 7.95 3573
48.6 5.2 6.83 1141
30.2 13.5 8.20 1547
42.8 10.2 7.37 2291
43.2 10.4 7.46 775
42.5 10.5 7.43 2074
33.0 12.9 7.99 1992
34.5 15.2 8.18 177
37.3 12.1 7.75 1997
39.5 12.0 7.66 825
36.7 11.5 7.69 679
37.7 11.4 7.70 3706
41.4 13.4 7.63 550
2004
Perceived demand
low = score of 6 or less (of 15)
high = score of 12 or more (of 15) 
Table 6. Estimated Partial Effects for Arrears Equations, 1995-2004 
 
   NOTPAID  OWED  NOPAYM 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)    (6) 
Year  dummies                
1995   0.043*** 
(0.013) 
- -0.076***
(0.016) 
-   -0.235*** 
(0.036)  
- 
1996   0.117*** 
(0.016) 
0.096*** 
(0.015) 
0.111*** 
(0.020) 
0.085*** 
(0.021) 
 -0.007 
(0.043)  
-0.082** 
(0.036) 
2000   -0.051***
(0.009) 
-0.052***
(0.008) 
-0.263***
(0.011) 
-0.267***
(0.011) 
 -0.433*** 
(0.031)   
-0.449*** 
(0.031) 
2001   -0.031***
(0.010) 
- -0.199***
(0.013) 
-   -0.516*** 
(0.033)   
- 
2002   -0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.040***
(0.010) 
-0.208***
(0.014) 
-0.224***
(0.015) 
 -0.543*** 
(0.033)   
-0.609*** 
(0.034) 
2003   -0.062***
(0.009) 
-0.066***
(0.009) 
-0.240***
(0.013) 
-0.250***
(0.014) 
 -0.568*** 
(0.033)   
-0.625*** 
(0.037) 
2004   -0.084***
(0.008) 
-0.087***
(0.008) 
-0.276***
(0.012) 
-0.285***
(0.013) 
 -0.683*** 
(0.033)   
-0.735*** 
(0.038) 
Region dummies               
Northern and North 
Western 
 -0.040***
(0.008) 
-0.030***
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
 -0.033 
(0.046)   
0.012 
(0.057) 
North Caucasian   -0.038***
(0.008) 
-0.031***
(0.010) 
-0.084***
(0.016) 
-0.064***
(0.018) 
 -0.186*** 
(0.040)   
-0.128*** 
(0.049) 
Ural   -0.044***
(0.007) 
-0.044***
(0.008) 
-0.075***
(0.013) 
-0.071***
(0.015) 
 -0.195*** 
(0.035)   
-0.166*** 
(0.040) 
Central and Central 
Black-Earth 
 -0.052***
(0.007) 
-0.043***
(0.008) 
-0.056***
(0.014) 
-0.042** 
(0.016) 
 -0.222*** 
(0.037)   
-0.204*** 
(0.040) 
Western Siberian   0.011 
(0.012) 
0.0005 
(0.012) 
0.084*** 
(0.019) 
0.097*** 
(0.023) 
 0.117** 
(0.055)   
0.118* 
(0.064) 
Eastern Siberian and 
Far Eastern 
 -0.003 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
 -0.011 
(0.044)  
0.014 
(0.051) 
Moscow / St. 
Petersburg 
 -0.069***
(0.009) 
-0.062***
(0.010) 
-0.125***
(0.017) 
-0.136***
(0.019) 
 -0.322*** 
(0.051)  
-0.393*** 
(0.050) 
Occupation dummies               
Managers & 
professionals 
 -0.042***
(0.009) 
-0.032***
(0.011) 
-0.068***
(0.018) 
-0.051** 
(0.021) 
  -0.073 
(0.046)  
-0.039 
(0.053) 
Skilled technical & 
administrative 
 -0.051***
(0.009) 
-0.042***
(0.010) 
-0.069***
(0.017) 
-0.056***
(0.019) 
 -0.116*** 
(0.042)  
-0.068 
(0.050) 
Clerical, sales, 
service 
 -0.047***
(0.009) 
-0.045***
(0.010) 
-0.114***
(0.016) 
-0.119***
(0.018) 
  -0.240*** 
(0.042)   
-0.240*** 
(0.042) 
Teachers, nurses, 
social workers 
 -0.030***
(0.010) 
-0.024* 
(0.012) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
 0.016 
(0.057)   
0.034 
(0.061) 
Skilled manual   -0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.020) 
 -0.098** 
(0.044)   
-0.098** 
(0.049) 
Semi-skilled 
manual 
 -0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.020* 
(0.010) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
  -0.056 
(0.038)  
-0.045 
(0.046) 
               
Rural settlement    0.078*** 
(0.007) 
0.083*** 
(0.009) 
0.088*** 
(0.011) 
0.090*** 
(0.013) 
 0.283*** 
(0.037)   
0.248*** 
(0.043) 
Local unemployment rate    0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 0.029*** 
(0.006)   
0.013** 
(0.006) 
               Ownership  type               
Foreign enterprise    -0.047***
(0.011) 
-0.056***
(0.011) 
-0.105***
(0.019) 
-0.121***
(0.021) 
 -0.135** 
(0.068)  
-0.242*** 
(0.059) 
Russian enterprise    -0.018***
(0.006) 
-0.018***
(0.006) 
-0.041***
(0.009) 
-0.046***
(0.011) 
 0.050* 
(0.029)  
0.079** 
(0.033) 
               
Bad financial health    0.114*** 
(0.008) 
0.113*** 
(0.009) 
0.180*** 
(0.011) 
0.196*** 
(0.014) 
 0.353*** 
(0.037)   
0.356*** 
(0.042) 
Age   0.0004 
(0.0003)
0.0004 
(0.0003)
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
 -0.0004 
(0.001)   
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Female   -0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.029***
(0.011) 
-0.023* 
(0.012) 
 -0.094*** 
(0.032)  
-0.077** 
(0.034) 
Married   -0.001 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
 0.017 
(0.035)  
0.019 
(0.036) 
Education               
Vocation-level 
training 
 0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
0.0001 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
  0.027 
(0.036)  
-0.001 
(0.040) 
University-level 
training 
 -0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
  0.020 
(0.037)   
-0.007 
(0.041) 
               
Tenure   -0.0005 
(0.0003)
-0.0003 
(0.0004)
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.009*** 
(0.001)   
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
               
Lag of NOTPAID    0.147*** 
(0.009) 
0.136*** 
(0.010) 
- -    -    - 
Lag of OWED    -  -  0.330*** 
(0.009) 
0.325*** 
(0.011) 
 -  - 
Lag of NOPAYM    -  -  -  -  0.071*** 
(0.003)   
0.066*** 
(0.004) 
               
PCVDMD1   X  -  X  -  X    - 
PCVDMD2   -  X  -  X  -    X 
                
Number of observations    17957  12767  17628  12534    15835   11315 
Percent correctly 
predicted   
85.1  86.0 76.9 78.2    -    - 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.1842  0.1928 0.2584 0.2794    0.3280   0.3494 
                
 
Since PCVDMD2 is not available in 1995 and 2001, these years were excluded from the corresponding 
regressions (columns 2, 4, and 6). 
 
The estimates for NOTPAID and OWED are obtained from probit regressions. 
The estimates for NOPAYM are obtained from Poisson regressions. 
 
Estimated partial effects of PCVDMD1 and PCVDMD2 are reported in Table 7 
 
Reference categories: 1998 year, Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin region, unskilled manual workers, state-
owned enterprises, and workers with some postsecondary education. 
 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses under partial effect 
estimates. 
*** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Table 7. Estimated Partial Effects of Perceived Demand on Arrears, 1995-2004 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variables    1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
              
NOTPAID PCVDMD1    -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
              
 PCVDMD2    -  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
       (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
              
OWED PCVDMD1    -0.028***  -0.028***  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028***  0.002 0.002 0.002 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
              
 PCVDMD2    -  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  -  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
       (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
              
NOPAYM PCVDMD1   -0.045***  -0.045***  -0.045***  -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
      (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
              
 PCVDMD2    -  -0.028**  -0.028**  -0.028**  -  -0.028** -0.167*** -0.028** 
       (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.014) (0.042) (0.014) 
              
 
Since PCVDMD2 is not available in 1995 and 2001, the corresponding estimates are missing. 
 
The estimates for NOTPAID and OWED are obtained from probit regressions. 
The estimates for NOPAYM are obtained from Poisson regressions. 
 
Estimated partial effects of the other variables included in the regressions are reported in Table 6. 
 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses under the partial effect estimates. 
* = significant at the 10% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level 
 Table 8. Estimated Partial Effects for Job Change Equations, 2000-2004 
 
 NEWJOB 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Year dummies             
2001 -0.056***
(0.008)   
-0.057***
(0.009)   
-0.053***
(0.009)   
-0.052*** 
(0.010)   
-0.049***
(0.009)   
-0.052***
(0.010) 
2002 -0.063***
(0.009)   
- 
 
-0.060***
(0.009)   
- 
 
-0.050***
(0.010)   
- 
2003 -0.069***
(0.010)  
-0.072***
(0.012)  
-0.066***
(0.010)  
-0.068*** 
(0.012)  
-0.060***
(0.011)  
-0.064***
(0.013) 
2004 -0.067***
(0.010)  
-0.066***
(0.011)  
-0.063***
(0.010)  
-0.062*** 
(0.012)  
-0.053***
(0.011)  
-0.056***
(0.012) 
Region dummies             
Northern and North 
Western 
0.013 
(0.014)   
0.010 
(0.016)   
0.008 
(0.014)   
0.006 
(0.016)   
0.002 
(0.014)   
-0.003 
(0.016) 
North Caucasian  0.006 
(0.014)   
0.004 
(0.015)   
0.008 
(0.014)   
0.006 
(0.015)   
0.007 
(0.014)   
0.006 
(0.015) 
Ural  -0.011 
(0.010)   
-0.010 
(0.011)   
-0.011 
(0.010)   
-0.010 
(0.011)   
-0.011 
(0.011)   
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Central and Central 
Black-Earth 
-0.018* 
(0.009)  
-0.027** 
(0.010)  
-0.019* 
(0.009)  
-0.027** 
(0.010)  
-0.020**
(0.010)  
-0.027**
(0.010) 
Western Siberian  -0.017 
(0.013)  
-0.020 
(0.015)  
-0.018 
(0.013)  
-0.021 
(0.015)  
-0.016 
(0.013)  
-0.014 
(0.015) 
Eastern Siberian and 
Far Eastern 
0.002 
(0.013)  
-0.003 
(0.014)  
0.001 
(0.013)  
-0.003 
(0.014)  
-0.001 
(0.013)  
-0.006 
(0.014) 
Moscow / St. 
Petersburg 
-0.037***
(0.012)   
-0.038** 
(0.014)   
-0.037***
(0.012)   
-0.038** 
(0.014)   
-0.032**
(0.013)   
-0.034**
(0.014) 
Occupation dummies             
Managers & 
professionals 
-0.027** 
(0.011)  
-0.024* 
(0.013)  
-0.027** 
(0.011)  
-0.024* 
(0.013)  
-0.026**
(0.011)  
-0.023 
(0.013) 
Skilled technical & 
administrative 
-0.025** 
(0.011)   
-0.027** 
(0.013)   
-0.026** 
(0.011)   
-0.028** 
(0.012)   
-0.026**
(0.011)   
-0.027**
(0.013) 
Clerical, sales, 
service 
-0.003 
(0.012)  
-0.004 
(0.014)  
-0.002 
(0.012)  
-0.002 
(0.014)  
0.0004 
(0.012)  
0.001 
(0.014) 
Teachers, nurses, 
social workers 
-0.060***
(0.010)   
-0.057***
(0.012)   
-0.061***
(0.010)   
-0.058*** 
(0.012)   
-0.058***
(0.011)   
-0.055***
(0.012) 
Skilled manual  -0.006 
(0.012)  
-0.012 
(0.013)  
-0.006 
(0.012)  
-0.012 
(0.013)  
-0.003 
(0.012)  
-0.009 
(0.013) 
Semi-skilled 
manual 
-0.018 
(0.011)   
-0.018 
(0.012)   
-0.018* 
(0.011)   
-0.018 
(0.012)   
-0.017 
(0.011)   
-0.018 
(0.012) 
             
Rural settlement  -0.014* 
(0.008)  
-0.017* 
(0.009)  
-0.012 
(0.008)  
-0.017* 
(0.009)  
-0.007 
(0.008)  
-0.010 
(0.009) 
Local unemployment rate  -0.006***
(0.002)  
-0.007***
(0.002)  
-0.006***
(0.002)  
-0.007*** 
(0.002)  
-0.006***
(0.002)  
-0.006***
(0.002) 
Ownership type             
Foreign enterprise  0.001 
(0.015)   
0.019 
(0.019)   
0.003 
(0.015)   
0.021 
(0.019)   
0.007 
(0.015)   
0.027 
(0.020) 
Russian enterprise  0.055*** 
(0.007)   
0.051*** 
(0.008)   
0.055*** 
(0.007)   
0.053*** 
(0.008)   
0.056***
(0.007)   
0.054***
(0.008) 
             
Bad financial health  0.024*** 
(0.008)  
0.028*** 
(0.010)  
0.024*** 
(0.008)  
0.026*** 
(0.010)  
0.022***
(0.009)  
0.025***
(0.010) Age -0.002***
(0.0003)   
-0.002***
(0.0004)  
-0.002***
(0.0003)  
-0.002*** 
(0.0004)   
-0.002***
(0.0003)  
-0.002***
(0.0004)
Female -0.039***
(0.008)   
-0.050***
(0.009)   
-0.038***
(0.008)   
-0.049*** 
(0.009)   
-0.038***
(0.008)   
-0.050***
(0.009) 
Married -0.001 
(0.007)  
-0.006 
(0.009)  
-0.002 
(0.007)  
-0.006 
(0.009)  
0.002 
(0.007)  
-0.004 
(0.009) 
Education             
Vocation-level 
training 
-0.002 
(0.009)  
-0.005 
(0.010)  
-0.002 
(0.009)  
-0.005 
(0.010)  
-0.002 
(0.009)  
-0.004 
(0.011) 
University-level 
training 
-0.002 
(0.010)   
-0.004 
(0.011)   
-0.002 
(0.010)   
-0.004 
(0.011)   
0.001 
(0.010)   
0.001 
(0.011) 
             
Tenure -0.006***
(0.001)   
-0.007***
(0.001)   
-0.006***
(0.001)   
-0.007*** 
(0.001)   
-0.006***
(0.001)   
-0.007***
(0.001) 
Monthly wage/1000  -0.003** 
(0.001)   
-0.003* 
(0.001)   
-0.003** 
(0.001)   
-0.003* 
(0.001)   
-0.003**
(0.001)   
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
                   
NOTPAID 0.048*** 
(0.010)   
0.041*** 
(0.011)   
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
OWED - 
 
- 
 
0.033*** 
(0.008)   
0.034*** 
(0.009)   
0.036***
(0.009)   
0.044***
(0.011) 
NOPAYM - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.001 
(0.001)   
-0.003**
(0.002) 
             
PCVDMD1  X  -  X  -   X  - 
PCVDMD2  -  X  -  X  -   X 
             
Number  of  observations 11534   8503   11532   8502   11027   8139 
Percent correctly 
predicted  86.3  86.1  86.2  86.1  86.5  86.4 
Pseudo  R2  0.0989  0.1030  0.0982  0.1034  0.0942  0.099 
             
 
Since PCVDMD2 is not available in 2001 (job change data from 2002), this year was excluded from the 
corresponding regressions (columns 2, 4, and 6). 
 
The estimates are obtained from probit regressions. 
All independent variables are measured in the period preceding the period of the job change. 
Estimated partial effects of PCVDMD1 and PCVDMD2 are reported in Table 9. 
 
Reference categories: 2000 year, Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin region, unskilled manual workers, state-
owned enterprises, and workers with some postsecondary education. 
 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses under partial effect 
estimates. 
*** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. 
 
 Table 9. Estimated Partial Effects of Perceived Demand on the Job Change, 2000-2004 
 
Perceived 
demand 
measure 
Arrears 
measure 
included 
  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 
            
PCVDMD1 NOTPAID    0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
            
 OWED    0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
            
 OWED  and 
NOPAYM 
 0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
            
PCVDMD2 NOTPAID    0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
- 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
            
 OWED    0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
- 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
            
 OWED  and 
NOPAYM 
 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
- 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
            
 
Since PCVDMD2 is not available in 2001 (job change data from 2002), the corresponding estimates 
are missing. 
 
The estimates are obtained from probit regressions. 
Perceived demand is measured in the period preceding the period of the job change. 
Estimated coefficients of the other variables included in the regressions are reported in Table 8. 
 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses under 
partial effect estimates. 
* = significant at the 10% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level 
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